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Introduction: 
 Much has been written on the “power of the press”: the power journalists, editors, and 
publishers have to decide what the issues are and how to frame them. Some say this with an 
ominous tone, and blame the news media for a wide variety of societal ills. Others explain that 
the frames, the contexts, we use to make sense of the world around us are a part of us, and are the 
only way we know how to convey meaning to others.  
 The field of public relations, on the other hand, exercises a very deliberate kind of 
framing, and they exercise this on the press. Many public relations professionals deal directly 
with the public; others compose the press releases used to entice the press to cover a story, and to 
do it from a particular angle.  
 The U. S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, known worldwide as the CDC, is a 
globally important force for public health and health communication. The CDC sees their 
messages mediated in the press frequently. They also have a press office. This study analyzes the 
framing involved in the CDC’s press releases on certain health issues, as well as in the press 
stories that cover the same issues.  
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 Research Questions 
 The CDC knows what their health communication goals are when they disseminate a 
press release on a certain issue. Are their uses of framing, and their adherence to best practices 
supporting their goals? Through the lens of framing and best practices, I looked at how the CDC 
could address the journalistic need for balance, multiple viewpoints, information, revenue, and 
readership in a way that can help increase the effectiveness of their releases. 
In cases in which the CDC disseminated press releases in response to a health risk event 
that also received coverage in the following major newspapers: USA Today, the New York Times, 
the Washington Post, the Los Angeles Times, and the Atlanta Journal Constitution. 
• How has the CDC framed to present health risks and crisis events in their press 
releases? 
• How have major U.S. newspapers framed the same public health events? 
• How can the CDC use the current body of evidence to improve its practices and 
increase its effectiveness? 
• Do the press releases reflect the lessons some of the agency’s authors say they 
have learned? 
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Research Theory  
 In this study I examined specific episodes of health risk- and crisis-related press releases 
disseminated by the CDC between 2002 and 2007. An archive of the CDC’s press releases is 
available on the CDC Web site.1 The practice is to archive all of the press releases, and I have 
looked at all of the releases on this site for the time period between 2002 and 2007.2 
I also studied press coverage of the same episodes in five major U.S. newspapers: USA 
Today, the New York Times, the Los Angeles Times, the Washington Post, and the Atlanta 
Journal-Constitution, also for the time period between 2002 and 2007. These newspaper articles 
were available via the Factiva and ProQuest databases. The New York Times was chosen as it is 
regarded as the nation’s newspaper of record. The Washington Post is almost as highly regarded, 
and is located in the U.S. capital, which is also home to the administration and the department 
under whose control the CDC operates. The Los Angeles Times was chosen as a well-respected 
representation from the west coast. USA Today was selected as the country’s only widely-
accepted national newspaper. The Atlanta Journal-Constitution was included as it is part of the 
same community as the CDC, and therefore has a different view of (and different access to) the 
CDC than any other major paper in the country. The newspaper samples included any editorial 
text (including letters to the editor and op-ed pieces) related to the topic that appeared between 
January 1, 2002, and December 31, 2007. One advertisement was included as an outlier because 
it prompted a direct response from the CDC in the form of a press release, and without the 
advertisement as context, the press release made little sense.  
                                                 
1 http://www.cdc.gov/od/oc/media/archives.htm  
2 The practice is to archive all of the press releases, so I have operated under the assumption that they have 
done so. 
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The CDC communications in this study came in the form of press releases focusing on 
specific health issues or events. The West Nile and listeriosis events used as case studies in this 
research were chosen because two represented clusters of press releases addressing a finite issue. 
The autism case was chosen because it was an ongoing issue with a heavy communication need, 
and it provided contrast to the other two. The following sets of keywords were used in finding 
newspaper articles. For West Nile virus, the search term was “WNV_AND_organ.” For 
listeriosis, “lister*” was used. For autism, “autis*_AND_vaccin*” was used. For all three, 
articles found (once read) to not pertain to the topic were excluded. 
Important themes involving various ways of manipulating and controlling public opinion 
emerged from the literature review. Concepts that occurred frequently were media monitoring, 
public appearance of the agency, setting the tone and agenda for the conversation, and taking 
control of a situation, in addition to genuine motives of promoting public health and safety. 
Based on preliminary research, I analyzed the press releases and newspaper stories for the 
presence of framing in order to explore how these two important health information sources are 
exerting influence over health issues. 
Framing Theory 
 Framing is the process by which a person decides what pieces of information to present 
when conveying a story to someone else. Framing relies on the symbols and assumptions people 
use to make sense of everything they experience. It is an essential and unavoidable part of human 
communication, and much of the time it is done subconsciously. However, when applied 
purposefully, framing can be used to shape a message to the advantage of the communicator.  
Public relations practitioners engage in specific, intentional framing, but the same cannot 
always be said for news reporting. Michael Schudson said that despite the assumption of some 
5 
media critics that it is possible to operate with complete objectivity, and that any deviation from 
complete fairness represents a bias, editors, media executives, and reporters must use judgment 
in choosing what to report and how to report it. In other words, objectivity should not be defined 
from lack of bias, and to expect pure objectivity in all cases is unreasonable and sometimes 
irresponsible. He gave as examples “whether to publish a letter or tract from a terrorist…or to air 
a videotape from Osama Bin Laden…whether to reveal or conceal information that might bear 
on national security, especially during time of war” or to “play down a murder or suicide because 
they fear it could inspire copycats.”3 In many cases, some bias reflects a responsibility to the 
preservation of a civil, free society.4  
Whatever the causes of bias, Schudson argued that “intentional, ideologically driven, or 
politically motivated bias does not dominate U.S. news institutions.”5 Rather, frames are more 
useful and relevant to study. Schudson quoted Todd Gitlin, saying that frames are “‘persistent 
patterns of cognition, interpretation, and presentation, of selection, emphasis, and exclusion, by 
which symbol-handlers organize discourse…’”6 
Schudson described framing as being absolutely central to the study of news. Framing, he 
said, “moves the analysis of news away from the idea of intentional bias. That is, to acknowledge 
that news stories frame reality is also to acknowledge that it would be humanly impossible to 
avoid framing. Every narrative account of reality necessarily presents some things and not 
others; consciously or unconsciously, every narrative makes assumptions about how the world 
works, what is important, what makes sense, and what should be.”7 Therefore, Schudson said, to 
                                                 
3 Michael Schudson. The Sociology of News. New York: W. W. Norton & Company, Inc, 2003, 34. 
4 Ibid. 
5 Schudson, 35. 
6 Schudson, 35, quoting Todd Gitlin, The Whole World is Watching, Berkeley: University of California Press, 
1979. 
7 Schudson, 35–36. 
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examine framing instead of intentional bias shifts the discussion to the unintentional perspectives 
people use to interpret events and symbols around them, rather than viewing “evidence of 
selection…as evidence of deceit, dissembling, or prejudice of individual journalists; it also draws 
attention to ways journalists select certain traditions and routines of the culture at large and the 
news business specifically.”8  
Chong and Druckman discussed framing theory at some length, starting with early mass 
public opinion research in the 1950s and 1960s. This early work seemed to indicate that the 
public is fickle and holds few stable, consistent, informed opinions.9 The authors considered 
“framing within the broader democratic process that links politicians and other opinion leaders to 
the public, primarily through the mass media,” also saying that “(t)he major premise of framing 
theory is that an issue can be viewed from a variety of perspectives and be construed as having 
implications fro multiple values or considerations.”10  
Chong and Druckman paraphrase previous research by Tuchman,11 Shah et al.,12 and 
Gamson and Modigliani,13 saying communication frames “‘organize everyday reality’ by 
providing ‘meaning to an unfolding strip of events’ and ‘promoting ‘particular definitions and 
interpretations of political issues.’”14 The authors wrote that a frame is only definable “in 
relation to a specific issue, event, or political actor,” and that researching these frames requires 
isolating specific attitudes. That is, a researcher can study overall attitudes about one specific 
                                                 
8 Ibid, 37. 
9 Dennis Chong and James N. Druckman.,“Framing Theory,” Annual Review of Political Science  
10 (2007): 103–104. 
10 Ibid., 104. 
11 See Tuchman 1978, 193. 
12 See Shah et al. 2002, 343. 
13 See Gamson and Modigliani 1987, 143; 1989. 
14 Ibid., 106. 
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issue, though “different frames may underlie each of these attitudes.” Additionally, framing fo
the same issue can be different at different points in history
r 
.15 
                                                
Johnson-Cartee conducted a detailed review of the literature on framing. She quoted 
Nelson, Clawson, and Oxley’s 1997 definition of framing, describing it as “the process by which 
a communication source, such as a news organization [or a political leader, public relations 
officer, political advertising consultant, or a news consumer]16, defines and constructs a political 
issue or public controversy.” She also quoted Tankard et al. (1991), saying “a frame is the central 
organizing idea for news content that supplies a context and suggests what the issue is through 
the use of selection, emphasis, exclusion, and elaboration.”  
Media framing research, according to Johnson-Cartee, “examines how news content 
influences and affects news consumers.”17 She lists many of the concepts various researchers 
have used to look at frames. She said, “when people engage in public discourse about political, 
economic, or social issues, they are engaging in public deliberation or the very essence of 
democracy. And when people engage in (collective and open) deliberation…they are necessarily 
engaged in issue framing.” The author also wrote that framing research can look at media or 
individual frames; 18 it is the former that I will be looking at in my study of the same issues as 
framed by both the newspaper media and a stakeholding federal agency. 
Hallahan looked at seven models of framing he said applied to public relations. He 
discussed framing as tied to the “psychological processes that people use to examine 
 
15 Chong and Druckman, 106. 
16 Italics preserved from original. 
17 Ibid, 25. 
18 Karen S. Johnson-Cartee, News Narratives and Framing (Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield 
Publishers, Inc., 2005), 24–25. 
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information” 19 and thus useful for studying the effects of public relations. Framing involves 
inclusion, exclusion, and emphasis.20 Ways of framing include valence framing (positive or 
negative), semantic framing (word choice), and story framing (storytelling in support of a 
theme).21 Priming is also an important part of framing; this process calls to mind any of a 
number of contexts or expectations under which something can be understood.22 He listed th
seven concepts that can be used in framing as situations, attributes, choices, actions, is
responsibility, and news.
e 
sues, 
                                                
23 
Framing of issues plays an important part in policy debate; therefore this idea is also 
useful to study of CDC communication and news. Hallahan defined an issue as “a 
dispute…usually over the allocation of resources or the treatment or portrayal of groups in 
society” and that they often need to be solved in a public forum.24 Issues may have financial , 
ethical, moral, social, or other aspects to them, and this contributes to agenda-setting as well as 
framing. Hallahan also said that “public health issues have been shown to be dramatically 
influenced by the way they are represented.”25  
Hallahan found framing to be very important to news reporting, as frames often 
determine “how stories are portrayed…in an effort to explain complex or abstract ideas in 
familiar, culturally resonating terms.” 26 Reporters investigating one incident may put that 
incident in the context of other people or things it may affect, or they may frame it in a broader 
concept for dramatic affect. “As the drama unfolds,” said Hallahan, “roles are…assigned to 
 
19 Kirk Hallahan. “Seven Models of Framing: Implications for Public Relations.” Journal of Public Relations 
Research 11, no. 3 (1999): 205–242. 
20 Ibid., 207. 
21 Ibid. 
22 Ibid., 208 
23 Ibid., 210. 
24 Ibid., 217. 
25 Ibid., 218. 
26 Ibid., 221 
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victims and villains” and responsibility may also be assigned.27 Examples of these “genres” 
which may apply to reporters writing about the CDC could include organizational corruption, 
safety lapses, government ineptitude in enacting or enforcing policies, waste, community 
activism, and the like. Episodic framing also applies; that refers to the coverage of news from an 
individual perspective. It exists in opposition to thematic framing, which covers issues at a 
societal level, often in terms of abstract concepts.  
Lawrence Wallack et al. describe media framing as an important topic of study because 
of the effects of the resulting coverage: 
The mass media have a two-step function. First, they select certain 
people and events for attention and thus contribute to setting the 
public agenda. Second, they frame the issue, telling the audience 
what is important to know about the story…the media may indeed 
tell people not only what issue to think about but how to think 
about that issue.28 
The authors described framing as the process of selecting what information to include 
and exclude when writing (or filming) a news story. They said that “despite ideals of 
objectivity,” the reality of reporting is that the “reporting, shaping, and presentation of news and 
information are subjective. Everything cannot be said about every issue in the short space of a 
newspaper article or television broadcast.”29 Furthermore, they said the decisions about what to 
                                                 
27 Ibid. 
28 Lawrence Wallack, et al. Media Advocacy and Public Health: Power for Prevention. (Newbury Park, 
California: Sage Publications, 1993), 67. The authors posited the latter in contrast to Cohen’s (1963) “oft-
cited” saying that the media don’t tell people what to think, but they tell them what to think about. This same 
axiom is cited in John R. Finnegan Jr. and K. Viswanath, “Communication Theory and Health Behavior 
Change.” in Health Behavior and Health Education,  eds. Karen Glanz, Barbara K. Rimer, and Frances 
Marcus Lewis (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 2002), 372. 
29 Wallack et al., 67. 
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include or exclude from a story are based on “professional training and personal experience,” 
and that the meaning of this collection of facts is “shaped by the context in which they are 
presented.”30 
Wallack et al. wrote of a few different methods by which framing takes place; they 
assume that a news story is about a problem of some sort, and argue that framing serves to assign 
responsibility for that problem. Journalists can frame using images and symbols, choice of 
spokespeople, word choice, and by defining the problem (or problems that make up an issue) on 
different levels.31 Symbols used in public health stories may include images or imagery of lab 
coats and test tubes to connote science or medicine, or of flags and official seals to connote the 
authority of government spokespersons.32 The authors said that “framing social and public health 
problems in the mass media occurs in a predictable way, based in American individualism”33 and 
also that “because the media reflect mainstream views of American society, they will usually 
frame issues to portray the overall social system as fundamentally sound.”34 Because of these 
things, problems are often portrayed as being aberrances based on individual action rather than 
corruptions or flaws in any given system. Referring to issues in terms of individual corruption, 
carelessness, mistake, irresponsibility, accidents or acts of God (the latter two of which can be 
construed as blameless), the authors said, “the media and their audience end up ignoring basic 
structural problems regarding how society is organized.”35  
Groups manage to get coverage on their issues by framing them as newsworthy36and/or 
by framing them as a specific kind of (usually oversimplified) content.37 Framing for content 
                                                 
30 Ibid., 68. 
31 Wallack et al., 68. 
32 Ibid. 
33 Ibid.  
34 Ibid., 69. 
35 Ibid.  
36 Ibid., 80. (“Framing for Newsworthiness”)  
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involves reframing a personal issue as a social issue, shifting the blame away from the 
individual, and presenting a solution. This may also involve making bits of information more 
accessible through “media bites” (the press equivalent of a sound bite would be a pullout quote), 
illustrative statistics (e.g., lung cancer kills X number of people a year, enough to fill the local 
stadium, etc.), and tailoring news to directly address a particular audience.38  
Framing for access refers to “structur(ing) stories so they meet the criteria of what 
constitutes news.”39 This includes anniversaries, controversies, breakthroughs, milestones, 
injustice, irony, seasonal issues, and other angles.40 The ones mentioned here all pertain to health 
reporting. 
In specifically addressing health and medical issues, the authors said health issues are 
portrayed in the same fashion. When risk factors for a disease or condition feature lifestyle 
components, those are emphasized.41 Based on the authors’ arguments, for example, an article 
about obesity would focus on a person’s responsibilities with regard to physical activity and diet.  
However, while this may continue to be the case, public health research in recent years 
has increasingly applied ecological models42 to analyzing health behaviors, focusing on 
environmental causes for some conditions. In addition to the personal responsibility involved in 
preventing obesity, many articles and studies have looked at underlying environmental reasons 
people may not observe recommendations on physical activity or diet. Is it safe to walk in the 
person’s neighborhood? Are there sidewalks? Is there violent crime? Do the person’s work and 
                                                                                                                                                             
37 Ibid., 82.  
38 Ibid., 105-113. 
39 Ibid., 97-105. 
40 Ibid. 
41 Ibid., 69. 
42 James F. Sallis and Neville Owen, “Ecological Models of Health Behavior,”  in Health Behavior and Health 
Education,  eds. Karen Glanz, Barbara K. Rimer, and Frances Marcus Lewis (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 
2002), 468-479.  
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family responsibilities legitimately leave no time for exercise or food preparation? Does the 
person know how to prepare healthy meals? If the person does not have access to a car, can they 
easily get to a store that sells fresh fruits and vegetables? Or are junk food and sodas the only 
things easily affordable and accessible?43 These kinds of questions appearing in more and more 
research, and subsequently they are showing up in more and more press reports.  
Wallack et al. pointed out that the perception that “social and health problems are 
individual problems pervades society and is reinforced through framing in the mass media.”44 
The authors said this is so despite the preponderance of ecological boundaries and influences that 
are beyond the control of the individual, but that influence the actions of the individual. 
Examples the authors gave include a large volume of misleading marketing messages from 
alcohol and tobacco companies, and the fact that federal agencies are charged with researching 
and preventing AIDS, yet are prohibited at times from using the word “condom” in their mass 
media materials.45 
 Groups often frame themselves and their issues as defined in opposition to other groups 
and issues; this is known as a contested frame. Wallack et al. said that “facts are presented and 
interpreted via cultural symbols,” often ones that evoke strong images or symbols, and positive 
or negative emotions.46 One example the authors give is the tobacco debate, in which the tobacco 
companies cast themselves as “protector of free choice” and their anti-tobacco opponents as 
“health fascists” and “government interventionalists.” The anti-tobacco campaigners in return 
managed to frame the tobacco industry as deceitful “merchants of death.”47 
                                                 
43 Ibid. 
44 Wallack, et al., 69-70. 
45 Ibid., 70. 
46 Ibid., 70-71. 
47 Ibid., 71. 
13 
 The news media, on the other hand, are more likely to engage in episodic and thematic 
framing. The news, they argued, generally uses episodic framing—a “short, simple, and personal 
story” such as one that looks at one person—to represent issues.48 This, they said, serves to 
“reinforce an exceptionalist, individualistic frame for social problems.”49 Thematic framing, they 
said, provide a more complex, abstract, and broad view of an issue, often presenting data 
scientific reports to back up claims. The authors described thematic framing as “present(ing) the 
collective case of an issue rather than the individual or personal one.”50 Much of their arguments 
on episodic and thematic framing focused on Iyengar’s 1991 work on television news,51 but 
similar framing does appear in newspaper coverage.  
Framing theory has its place in public health. Finnegan and Viswanath described framing 
as “organized public discourse about an issue leading to the selection of features and the 
exclusion of others”; in a public health application, “advocacy groups (would) ‘package’ an 
important health issue for the media and the public.”52 In fact, the CDC’s sister organization, the 
National Institutes of Health (NIH, also a division of the U.S. Department of Health and Human 
Services) encouraged public health organizations to use framing to get their message to the press. 
The NIH’s National Cancer Institute published a guide explaining framing and other theoretical 
approaches to encouraging positive health behaviors in 2005. The guide explained framing as “a 
process in which someone tells the audience what aspect of the story is important,” and that 
                                                 
48 Ibid., 72. 
49 Ibid., 73. 
50 Ibid., 72. 
51 Ibid., 72-73. 
52 John R. Finnegan Jr. and K. Viswanath, “Communication Theory and Health Behavior Change.” in Health 
Behavior and Health Education,  eds. Karen Glanz, Barbara K. Rimer, and Frances Marcus Lewis (San 
Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 2002)  373. 
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“public health advocates can use the media to pressure decision makers to develop and support 
healthy policies.”53  
Frames of reference have a great influence on human communication—in fact, one could 
argue that this concept is the basis of shared meaning. Public relations professionals use framing 
to create the frame in which their subject is understood to its best advantage. By evoking certain 
images or concepts and/or focusing on certain aspects, whether done overtly or subtly, public 
relations activities aim to shape the way their subject is understood by controlling the context.  
Framing and Qualitative Content Analysis 
Qualitative methods are well suited to exploring and discovering the framing that may lie 
hidden in the press releases and press coverage. Several studies examining news releases and/or 
press coverage used qualitative content analysis methods. Larsen claimed Kracauer’s54 argument 
that “a text must be received as a meaningful whole, and hence that analysis necessarily involves 
an act of interpretation which, like other readings, is based on specific assumptions to be made 
explicit in the course of analysis”55 when he conducted his analysis of fictional media content. 
Furthermore, he said the text should be considered an “intersection” of “intentions and possible 
effects” and that the researcher’s job was to “bring out the whole range of possible meanings, not 
least the ‘hidden’ message of the text.”56 
Gallagher et al. analyzed news releases from before, during, and after Hurricanes Katrina 
and Rita, examining how different organizations affected by the hurricanes framed their crisis 
communications. The authors examined releases from two federal agencies (not including the 
                                                 
53 National Cancer Institute, Theory at a Glance: A Guide for Health Promotion Practice, U.S. Department of 
Health and Human Services, September 2005. 
54 See Kracauer (1953), 637. 
55 These are Larsen’s words, with the italics preserved. 
56 Peter Larsen, “Media Contexts: Textual Analysis of Fictional Media,” A Handbook of Qualitative 
Methodologies for Mass Communication Research, Ed. by Klaus Bruhn Jensen and Nicholas W. Jankowski. 
(New York : Routledge, 1991), 121–134. 
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CDC) and several U.S. senators and governors representing Mississippi, Louisiana, and Texas. 
They conducted a qualitative content analysis based on the work of Benoit and Coombs, 
examining both crisis types and crisis responses.  
The authors analyzed how the releases framed the crisis, saying, “In public relations, 
framing analysis is often associated with issues management. Further, framing is related to how 
public relations practitioners position a story for media coverage.”57 They, looked at nearly 2000 
releases from the organizations chosen, over a roughly six-month period starting a few days 
before Hurricane Katrina made landfall in the Gulf states. They “examined how the 
organizations framed the crises, then…evaluate(d) the effectiveness of those claims.”58 The 
authors coded each news release “to organize the themes,” then developed the theme categories 
afterward. The findings showed, among other things, that among the different themes that 
emerged, different themes showed differing degrees of neutrality and accusation, but that each 
entity in the study attempted to build support for their position.59 
Wester et al. engaged in a sort of immersion technique when they performed a qualitative 
content analysis on 53 years of Dutch and German news coverage. They used their study of how 
the press in the Netherlands and Germany portrayed each other to develop a “logic for 
interpretive content analysis,”60 which involved reading and re-reading the press clips looking 
for different, more detailed meaning in them. They referred to the reading and re-reading as a 
“sensitizing concept”61 that helped them identify frames. When they wanted to focus on a 
                                                 
57 Amanda Hall Gallagher, Maria Fontenot, and Kris Boyle. “Communicating During Times of Crisis: An 
Analysis of News Releases From the Federal Government Before, During, and After Hurricanes Katrina and 
Rita.” Public Relations Review 33 (2007), 218. 
58 Ibid. 
59 Ibid. 218–219. 
60 Fred Wester, Alexander Pleijtner, and Karsten Renckstorf, “Exploring Newspapers’ Portrayals: A Logic for 
Interpretive Content Analysis,” Communications 29 (2004): 495–513. 
61 Ibid., 500. 
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particular event, they looked at coverage from one week before the event through one week after 
the event.62  
For analyzing frames in a selection of content, Chong and Druckman advocated using 
inductive reasoning to identify the frames. They also identified “mass media sources including 
major newspapers, magazines, Web sites, and television broadcasts” as common content selected 
for such a content analysis. The specifics of the content choices must suit the researcher’s intent, 
and “the ‘best’ standard for any particular study may depend on that study’s assumptions and 
purpose.”63 It is the researcher’s job to identify “the presence or absence of one of the predefined 
frames in the story or article.”64 
Sometimes content analysis reveals drastically different frames. Perkins conducted a 
qualitative framing analysis of NAACP press releases compared to news articles in mainstream 
U.S. papers in Florida, in the time immediately following the contested 2000 presidential 
election. She concludes that the media framing was so different from the NAACP’s framing that 
perhaps the NAACP’s messages were ignored. For her qualitative content analysis, Perkins 
obtained the 10 press releases issued during the study period, and searched Lexis-Nexis for 
articles from the same time period. From those articles, she took a random sample to analyze. 
The articles were read and coded using the frames that emerged during the analysis.65  
The abovementioned authors make a solid case for using qualitative content analysis and 
inductive reasoning to explore the issue of framing in PR and the news. They looked at the 
evidence, the source material, to identify the framing based on the content of the evidence. I did 
the same with my source material, searching it for patterns, uses of certain words (also to be 
                                                 
62 However, this was a longitudinal study, to which this selection method may be more suited. 
63 Ibid., 109. 
64 Ibid, 107. 
65 Stephynie Chapman Perkins, “Un-presidented: A Qualiative Framing Analysis of the NAACP’s  
Public Relations Response to the 2000 Presidential Election.” Public Relations Review 31 (2005): 63–71. 
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determined via the analysis); and possibly reading levels, levels of abstraction, and other 
qualities. 
Press reports represent several different layers of framing. In the cases examined in this 
study, the CDC attempted to frame the issues via its press releases. Newspaper reporters framed 
the issues when they wrote; their editors may have added their own bit of framing. The various 
sources66 the reporters quoted and the people they interviewed were all chosen because they had 
an opinion to offer on the topic—they were all presenting the issue in their own frames. In many 
cases, there were conflicts between sources advocating negative (fear) frames and positive 
(reassurance and empowerment) frames.  
 
                                                 
66 Some of these sources were other federal agencies besides the CDC. I have included their framing where it 
appears.  
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Significance 
The CDC is widely recognized as the premier global public health organization. They 
provide an important service toward the greater good. People and governments all over the world 
depend on the CDC’s research and information. Improvements to their communication practices 
would enable them to better serve people and improve public health. 
In this study I examined crisis and risk communication. Health issues involving risk and 
crisis require disseminating information of an urgent nature, and these urgent releases will be 
more likely to require or invite media attention. A large amount of press coverage for an issue is 
significant because the more press coverage an issue or a release receives, the more opportunities 
there are for the message to be mediated, and framed in different ways. I chose to study press 
releases because they are a purposeful, overt attempt at framing an issue. 
Media coverage, including health reporting, is part of a feedback loop in which reported 
news affects peoples’ health-information-seeking behavior and news consumption habits, which 
again drives news content. Media studies are important to the field of public health; many studies 
have shown that people’s interaction with the media affects their health behaviors.67 Likewise, 
many studies show that people’s behaviors affect the content of the news.68 As Martin Meyer 
said, whether realistically or cynically, “advertisers like to see heavy newsstand sales; news 
judgment at a magazine involves the editor’s decision of what the public wants to buy this 
week.”69 
                                                 
67 John R. Finnegan Jr. and K. Viswanath, 377-379. 
68 Sanjay Bhatt. “Useful Lessons From Reporting the Anthrax Story.” Nieman Reports: Reporting on Health. 
Summer 2003. Cambridge, MA: Nieman Foundation of Harvard University.  57:1, 14. 
69 Martin Meyer, Making News. Boston: Harvard Business School Press, 1993. 74. 
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Chong and Druckman wrote that frames “can affect the attitudes and behaviors of their 
audiences.”70 They also wrote that “conversations about the implications of framing are timely, 
as it is commonplace nowadays for polling to be used to test the effectiveness of alternate 
methods of presenting policy proposals. To the extent that people do not have independent ideas 
on the issues they are being asked to vote on, they can more easily be manipulated by the 
framing of proposals….their opinions are vulnerable to being shaped arbitrarily by how the issue 
is represented.”71 Hallahan put it another way: “Critical researchers consider media framing 
essentially a tool of power that can be used in the struggle to define whose view of the world will 
predominate.”72 
The actions of the CDC’s communications office have the potential to affect numerous 
different groups. How, or whether, they choose to act on a particular health issue can have 
repercussions for government officials (both elected and appointed), researchers and leaders at 
different levels of the CDC, and the CDC as a whole agency. The repercussions for their actions 
can be felt at many levels: personal, community, specific population, and the U.S. or global 
public as a whole, depending on the issue and the actions taken on that issue. Not only do public 
health communications affect the CDC at different levels, it’s seldom transparent to the press or 
the public—and sometimes even CDC personnel—who is the source of some of the public health 
decisions upon which the communications office must act. 
When members or employees of an organization write a press release on behalf of that 
organization, they are framing an issue. The purpose of issuing a press release is to provide 
information about an issue. However, in doing so, the organization creating the release will 
                                                 
70 Dennis Chong and James N. Druckman. “Framing Theory.” Annual Review of Political Science  
10 (2007): 109. 
71 Ibid., 121. 
72 Hallahan, 1999, 223. 
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almost certainly want to frame the issue and discussion about the issue in a manner most 
beneficial to itself.  
When the media reports on an issue, it is also framing the issue. This can result in similar 
frames, but there is the potential for those frames to conflict. If the CDC communication staff’s 
messages are misconstrued by the media, or if the CDC’s public relations and health messaging 
tactics are ineffective, that such miscommunications pose a potential public health threat. With 
the frame defining the issue, and the public’s health at stake, the question of media and PR 
framing is an important one. This research adds to the body of knowledge about CDC press 
relations, including health communication and press relations. 
 
21 
Review of the Literature  
Much work has been published in the field of corporate and commercial public relations, 
and some in the nonprofit/fundraising sector. The field of public relations research itself, 
however, is comparatively young and evolving.73 Much attention has already been given to 
audience research and monitoring in public relations. While the research almost uniformly 
espouses the value of doing so, it is also clear from the research that not everyone is doing this, 
especially in risk and crisis communications. In other words, the field has a well-documented 
best practice that is not being followed in all cases, particularly not when it is needed most. 
Like the field of journalism itself, good practices in journalism have been evolving and 
changing for hundreds of years. What may have been a good practice in the party press days 
would not be considered ethical or professional under today’s ideal of objective journalism. 
Currently, journalists are generally expected to be fair, balanced, and to be as objective as 
possible. The degree to which they are expected to muckrake, investigate, or toe a party line 
varies depending on the environment and the issue. With regard to public relations, though, 
running with a press release, and not looking for further information, can be considered lazy.   
Health communication, which is, like public relations, an applied communication field,74 
is also a fairly young field. As the field of health communication has evolved, more and more 
health communicators have come to realize the power of commercial-style marketing and public 
relations strategies and tactics. The CDC even started its own Center for Health Marketing in 
2004,75 with the intent of harnessing the consumer/marketer mindset to “productize” healthy 
behaviors and “sell” them to the public. Likewise, the CDC is placing more import on its Office 
                                                 
73 Botan and Taylor (2004), 645. 
74 Ibid. 
75 http://www.cdc.gov/healthmarketing/.  
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of Enterprise Communications and their Division of Media Relations. Their growing body of 
research indicates that the CDC is becoming wiser about the possibilities and potential for health 
communication and public and media relations. The amount of effort they have put into learning 
lessons from their own risk and crisis communications is impressive. While that can—and almost 
certainly does—bode well for the health and safety of the public, it also has potential for abuse 
considering its situation in a government agency led by political appointees, and considering the 
fact that the agency is under constant pressure to maintain its good reputation as a protector of 
the public health. 
Public relations and health communication were once two fields that appeared unlikely to 
intersect. However, in the past 10 or 20 years, interest in both fields has increased, with 
theoretical overlap in marketing, risk and crisis communication, and basic conveyance of control, 
empathy, or goodwill, as the situation required. Applicable research came from the private 
sector, communication researchers, and the CDC, to name a few important sources. 
A Brief History of the CDC 
The CDC evolved from its single-purpose beginning into its current roles as the world’s 
premier global health organization, and as a leader in health communication research. The 
agency was founded in 1942 as a small Public Health Service (PHS) department called Malaria 
Control in War Areas (MCWA)76, and became the Communicable Disease Center (CDC) in 
1946.77 Since that time, the CDC has become a leader in health action and research, including 
disease eradication, emerging infectious disease research, biology, chemistry, epidemiology, 
disease surveillance, behavior change, and health communication. 
                                                 
76 These “war areas” were military bases and war-related industries in the U.S. South. 
77 Elizabeth W. Etheredge, Sentinel for Health: A History of the Centers for Disease Control (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1992).  
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The CDC spent its first two decades defining its purpose and cementing its presence. In 
the 1940s, the CDC focused on tropical diseases (both insect-borne and zoological). Its founder, 
Dr. Joseph W. Mountin, pushed the organization to expand its reach to include any 
communicable disease, with the exceptions of tuberculosis and venereal disease, which already 
had their own separate centers.78 With this expansion, epidemiology became the driving force of 
the CDC.  
In the 1950s, the CDC’s new force, the Epidemic Intelligence Service (EIS) proved the 
CDC’s usefulness and the importance of national public health. EIS members investigated the 
possibility of biological warfare during the Korean War, and conducted the surveillance of the 
1957 Asian Flu epidemic.79 Most famously, the EIS also conducted the surveillance that saved 
the Salk polio vaccine80, thus paving the way for polio to be eradicated in the Western 
hemisphere.81 By the mid-1960s, the CDC was responsible for many more health issues, 
including tuberculosis, quarantine, nutrition, and occupational safety. They were also publishing 
the Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report, or MMWR, a weekly publication dedicated to 
sharing news of disease research and surveillance. 
The CDC changed its name to the Center for Disease Control in 1970, in recognition of 
the broadened scope of its public health contributions. In 1977 they (along with the World Health 
Organization and other groups) saw the global eradication of smallpox; in roughly the same 
                                                 
78 “Historical Perspectives: History of CDC.” Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report. 45(25); 526–530. 28 
June 1996. Elizabeth W. Etheredge is not listed as the author of the article; however, the article itself claims 
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80 Maryn McKenna. Beating Back the Devil: On the Front Lines with the Disease Detectives of the Epidemic 
Intelligence Service. New York: Free Press, 2004.  
81 Children who had been inoculated against polio began coming down with the disease; officials halted the 
vaccinations. EIS members tracked the cases to a contaminated batch of vaccine from one production facility 
and proved the effectiveness of the vaccine, thereby allowing the vaccination program to resume. 
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timeframe they discovered the causes of Legionnaires disease and toxic shock syndrome. In June 
198182, their MMWR published the first article on the disease that would come to be known as 
AIDS.83 
The evolution of the organization’s name continued to reflect its expanding 
responsibilities. In 1981 the CDC became the (plural) Centers for Disease Control, and it began 
to focus more on collaboration between scientists: epidemiologists, laboratorians, and 
statisticians.84 In the late 1980s and early 1990s the CDC began to embrace prevention as a 
priority, conducting large studies of cancer risk factors, and refining scientific methods of both 
sentinel surveillance and determining the effectiveness of prevention efforts.85 To signify their 
involvement in these activities, the agency added “and Prevention” in 1992 to arrive at its current 
name, the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. It was at this time, when they began 
to see prevention as essential, that the agency began to take health communication seriously. 
Despite its original mission of preventing infectious diseases, the CDC has made many 
important contributions to the field of health communication. The agency has supported and 
conducted research in plain language communication, low literacy, Web usability, community- 
and culture-specific targeted campaigns, and social marketing. They have three prestigious 
public health journals which they make available to the public at no charge; something 
previously unheard of. They produce and distribute fact sheets, planning guides, podcasts, 
brochures, and numerous other communications materials. 
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Legal Authority of the CDC 
 Creation of the MCWA, as “National Defense Malaria Control Activities,” was 
authorized by a 1942 letter from then-Surgeon General Thomas Parran out of interest in 
protecting military personnel from malaria during World War II. After the war was over, the 
PHS established the Communicable Disease Center; although they secured approval from 
Congress, “no formal act of Congress was necessary.”86 Title 42, “The Public Health and 
Welfare,” is the sprawling, evolving piece of legislation that gives the CDC and other federal 
health agencies their mandates and authority.87   
The duties of the CDC are largely characterized as being to create and provide research 
data, guidelines, and advice on a variety of things, including diseases, conditions, interventions, 
implementations, and other public health projects. Much discretion is given to the secretary of 
HHS in the exercise of the duties and responsibilities outlined in Title 42. Much of the law states 
what HHS (and the CDC) may do rather than what they are to be held accountable for. Many of 
the items directed at the CDC are stated thusly: “The Secretary, acting through the Director of 
the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, may (or “shall”) make grants…”88 Among the 
authorities Title 42 specifically grants to the CDC are directing and enforcing foreign 
quarantines and collaborating with other agencies on various research projects.89 The same law 
established the National Vaccine Program, with the authority to administer and oversee the safe 
procurement and distribution of vaccines, and to direct and guide the CDC and other agencies as 
they research and test vaccines.90 Additional directives and funding are provided by earmarks. 
                                                 
86 Etheredge, 16. 
87 “The Public Health and Welfare,” USC 42. The U.S. Government Printing Office Web site at 
http://www.access.gpo.gov/uscode/title42/title42.html (accessed 4 June 2008).  
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History of Health Communication at the CDC 
The CDC’s own publications, namely the journals Emerging Infectious Diseases (EID), 
Preventing Chronic Disease (PCD), and the Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report (MMWR), 
are a valuable source of historical information. The MMWR published a supplemental issue in 
2006 entitled “60 Years of Public Health Science at CDC.” This issue contained 12 articles, with 
each giving an overview of different research areas and other factors as they affect public health, 
including epidemiology, veterinary medicine, informatics, laboratory science, and economics.91 
The MMWR is generally highly technical and statistical in nature; however, considering the 
important contributions the CDC has made to the field of health communication science, it is 
worth noting that such important research was not addressed in their celebratory retrospective. 
Courtney et al. described communication is “a relatively new discipline in the field of 
public health.” Agencies and other organizations focused their efforts on epidemiology, non-
communication-related prevention efforts (e.g., immunization), and providing scientific 
information to health professionals and other scientists. Scientists counted on the press to figure 
out what was important, and communicate that information to the public.92  
According to the authors, it was AIDS and other emergent diseases that awakened CDC 
to the fact that “communicating clearly to the public was…a necessary component of public 
health practice.”93 In 1993, under agency director William Roper, the CDC formed the Office of 
Communication (OC). The OC was responsible for “crafting and delivering messages and 
strategies, based on consumer research, to promote the health of individuals and communities.”94 
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The OC’s overarching goal was to build national capacity for health communication efforts by 
training the “public health workforce” to communicate effectively. Their primary method of 
attaining that goal was through their CDCynergy95 course96, which offers a systematic, 
organized way to plan, create, and implement health communications and social marketing 
campai
ed 
 led 
lic 
cal 
cal leaders would improve rapport and 
commu
nds 
                                                
gns.  
The Anthrax attacks in 2001 called for a quicker response than anything for which 
CDCynergy training had prepared people, and the attacks forced CDC to realize that they need
to broaden their scope when considering whom to train in public health communication. The 
Anthrax attacks ushered in a new focus on risk and crisis communication.97 Their experience
them to create the ERC (Emergency Risk Communication) CDCynergy training program to 
prepare public health officials to respond quickly in time of any crisis that could affect pub
health. Courtney et al. worked at the CDC at the time of the article’s authorship, and they 
recommended expanding ERC CDCynergy training to include community leaders and lo
officials. They said that including a number of lo
nication with the affected community.98  
It appears to have been the mid-1990’s when the CDC started evaluating its own 
communication efforts in order to hone them. Nowak99 and Siska used the “America Respo
to AIDS” (ARTA) public information and AIDS prevention campaign to examine the use of 
audience research in the creation and evolution of a public health communication campaign. 
According to the authors The CDC was aware that many mass media health campaigns had 
 
95 CDCynergy 3.0. CD-ROM-based course developed by the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 
and the Oak Ridge Institute for Science and Education (ORISE), 2005. Available via the Oak Ridge 
Associated Universities Web site at http://www.orau.gov/cdcynergy/.  
96 Courtney, et al., 128. 
97 Ibid 
98 Ibid, 129. 
99 Nowak is currently the CDC’s director of public relations. 
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limited success, so they asked the National Academy of Science (NAS) to recommend research 
and evaluation approaches for its HIV/AIDS communication activities. The NAS recommended
using formative research to determine which approaches work best, efficacy trials to see if the 
campaign could make a difference, process evaluation to find out what information was actuall
delivered, and outcome evaluation to determine if the campaign had its desired effects.
 
y 
retical frameworks should be 
ign. 
Journa
r 
e unlike any other problem the CDC had faced, and 
this wa
100 The 
authors describe the process of using these concepts to create, deliver, and evaluate messages. 
The authors conclude that a variety of research methods and theo
used in a “cycle of research” to develop an effective campa
l Articles From CDC Publications and Authors 
M. Scott Barrett used the CDC’s handling of the 2001 anthrax attacks to study how 
message control and spokespersons can affect public reaction. While he said the CDC had 
properly applied risk communication theory in disseminating information to doctors, and had 
thereby saved lives, he said the entire agency lost credibility in the public’s eyes due to the way 
communication was handled during the crisis. He concluded that poor message control, too many 
(often conflicting) spokespersons, and poor handling of the ambiguity surrounding this particula
crisis were all mistakes the agency could look to manage during future crises. However, as the 
author acknowledged, the anthrax attacks wer
s identified as a learning opportunity. 
Scott Ratzan, editor of the Journal of Health Communication, wrote that despite the 
health communicator’s “ethical base to do no harm and advance with scientific integrity and 
                                                 
100 Glen J. Nowak and Michael J. Siska. “Using Research to Inform Campaign Development and  
Message Design: Examples from the ‘America Responds to AIDS’ Campaign.”  
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humanism,”101 sometimes erroneous or irresponsible decisions are made in the drive to meet th
rapid-fire needs of today’s news media. He used the case of one 1998 British journal article to 
illustrate the devastating consequences these lapses in judgment can cause. In his example
lead author of a study claimed that the MMR (measles, mumps, and rubella) vaccine was 
associated with autism in children, and campaigned for six years to convince people this was a 
fact. After U.S. Institute of Medicine panel conducted a further study, they rejected the Britis
researcher’s hypothesis. A few years later, an article on the front page of the London Time
uncovered the fact that the researcher had been paid a large sum of money to conduct the 
research in support of possible lawsuits from parents who claimed their children had been 
damaged by the vaccine. However, despite this revelation, and the retraction by 10 of the original
study’s 13 authors, the perception remains that the vaccine causes autism, and a battle once w
must continue to be fought at the expense of public money and children’s lives. As a res
Ratzan called for an
e 
, the 
h 
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 institutionalization of ethics, values, and critical thinking in health 
commu
 task 
nication.102 
In “Order out of Chaos,” communication researcher and former director of 
communication at CDC Vicki Freimuth described the transition of the CDC to a major health 
communication organization. She looked back on her days at the CDC managing the anthrax 
crisis response in 2001. She described the challenges of an organization that took pride in its 
“slow, thoughtful scientific research” based on “scientific consensus” (142) somewhat suddenly 
having to communicate advice, direction, and reassurance based largely on uncertainty.  The
involved (from the abstract) “communicating uncertainty, selecting credible spokespersons, 
                                                 
101 Scott C. Ratzan. “Truth and Health Consequences” (Editorial). Journal of Health Communication 9 (2004), 
279–280. 
102 I find this particularly interesting because this example shows the public health communicators as the “bad 
guys” and the news media as the “good guys.” 
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collaborating with other organizations, satisfying a competitive 24/7 media, and speed. The 
lessons learned in responding to these challenges led to profound changes in the way 
commu
so in 
ould exert control over the information environment and the issue itself. While 
this art
 
et al. 
iety of 
communication plans. In addition to describing the CDC’s emergency communication plan, the 
                                                
nication was organized in the agency. These changes are described within the framework 
of chaos theory.”103  
Randolph and Viswanath discussed public health in mass media, and while they did 
the context of campaigns, there is still a part of the campaign (the PR aspect) that can be 
mediated. They reviewed factors that contribute to the success of public health mass media 
campaigns104 including message and health behavior theory, audience research, and 
manipulation of the discussion,105 and how to achieve these things. They suggested that 
communicators sh
icle dealt mostly with campaigns and social marketing, these concepts could be applied to 
public and media relations.  
The CDC’s communication activities before, during, and after Hurricane Katrina became
a case study of the agency’s disaster communication plan. The CDC’s Marsha Vanderford 
described in detail a comprehensive disaster communication plan that had been developed over 
years of research, then tested and proved in response to SARS, West Nile virus, and three 
hurricanes.  The CDC had created and distributed messages for a variety of media, in a var
languages, to be disseminated under a variety of possible circumstances in a variety of locations 
at appropriate phases during the emergency. However, Katrina proved to be an unusually 
devastating emergency, and its destruction quickly overwhelmed and short-circuited the CDC’s 
 
103 Vicki S. Freimuth,. “Order out of Chaos: The Self-Organization of Communication Following the Anthrax 
attacks.” Health Communication 20, no. 2 (2006): 141. 
104 Whitney Randolph and K. Viswanath. “Lessons Learned from Public Health Mass Media Campaigns: 
Marketing Health in a Crowded Media World.” Annual Review of Public Health, 25 (2004):421. 
105 I see the latter as an opportunity for framing. 
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article “address(ed) how lessons derived in the aftermath can be applied to future events, as we
as how CDC’s experience is relevant to health communication research.”
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106 Vanderford 
used chaos theory in their analysis (as Freimuth had the previous year), concluding that 
continued study of emergency response can help communicators see patterns in chaotic 
situations, and thereby better anticipate and prepare for the challenges that m
ncy situation, be it a natural disaster, disease outbreak, or terrorism. 
In the same journal issue, Robert S. Littlefield and Andrea M. Quenette used Hurricane 
Katrina as a test case to study how the media portrayed authority during a natural disaster. They 
conducted a textual analysis of crisis response coverage in two newspapers (the New York Time
and the New Orleans Times-Picayune), and looked at positive and negative representations of  
(to quote the abstract) “the military, the Department of Homeland Security, President Bush, 
federal government, and the local government. The findings suggest that the media stepped 
outside their role of objective observer and assumed a privileged position to point blame 
legitimate authority. This positioning implicitly empowered the media to evaluate crisis 
responses…Understanding how the media create im
ties frame their initial crisis responses.”107  
In the February 2002 issue of the National Communication Association (NCA)’s Spectra
that on October 31, 2001, “ Matthew Seeger reported on a CDC-sponsored national conferenc
on public health crisis communication, held in conjunction with the NCA conference, which 
gathered scholars in “sociology, psychology, and communication as well as representatives from 
 
106 Marsha L. Vanderford;, Teresa Nastoff, Jana L. Telfer, and Sandra E. Bonzo. “Emergency  
Communication Challenges in Response to Hurricane Katrina: Lessons from the Centers for Disease Control 
and Prevention.” Journal of Applied Communication Research 35, no. 1 (February 2007): 10. 
107 Robert S. Littlefield and Andrea M. Quenette. “Crisis Leadership and Hurricane Katrina: The Portrayal of 
Authority by the Media in Natural Disasters.” Journal of Applied Communication Research 35, no. 1 (2007): 
26–47. 
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the CDC and the Federal Emergency Management Administration.” Their goal was to “es
a research agenda for crisis communication and the public health.” Discussion about risk 
communication focused on audience needs and characteristics, uncertainty, technology, and th
media, among other things. Seeger said the conference had been planned before 9/11 and the 
anthrax attacks, and that Barbara Reynolds, the CDC’s director of crisis communication, didn’t 
want to limit discussion to those events—that West Nile virus, pandemic avian influenza, and e.
coli outbreaks were also serious threats to consider. He quotes her as saying, “Communica
forms a critical element of the CDC’s response to outbreaks of these and other infec
diseases.”
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108 As much research has been done on corporate and organizational risk 
communication, participants called for further
e and audience needs during a crisis.  
Seeger discussed best practices in risk communication in the lead article he w
2006 Journal of Applied Communication Research issue addressing risk and crisis 
communication. Seeger recommends ten best practices, building on the findings of an expert 
panel, intended to “improve organizational and professional practice.” He also advocated using 
these best practices as a grounded-theory approach to crisis communication, “specifically within 
the context of large, publicly managed crises.”109 In the same issue, Robert L. Heath, director of 
the Institute for the Study of Issues Management, praised Seeger’s article, attempted to refi
practices he listed, and added two more best practices to Seeger’s list. He described crisis 
response as a narrative that starts with pre-crisis conditions, and said communicators should 
commit themselves seriously to being the “first and best source of information” in a crisis. H
 
108 Matthew Seeger. “CDC Funding for Crisis Communication Research Highlighted at NCA Convention.” 
Spectra (February 2002): 7. 
109 Matthew W. Seeger. “Best Practices in Crisis Communication: An Expert Panel Process.” Journal of 
Applied Communication Research 24, no. 3 (2006): 232–244. 
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described risk as having effects that can have “positive or negative consequences,” and “the 
occurrence of which and the effects of which can be variously predicted, controlled, and harmful 
or bene
er 
 
d 
ce 
 best 
eed to be prepared, and the previously 
mentio
a 
 
                                                
ficial.” He also described a crisis as “a risk manifested.”110  
Barbara Reynolds, a crisis communication specialist with the CDC, responded to Seeg
and Heath, saying that the idea of best practices is valuable and helpful, but that it would be 
easy—and tempting—for everyone with crisis communication experience to continue adding to
the list. Reynolds said that the real objectives of crisis communication are simple and few, an
here she cited the Department of Homeland Security’s 2005 Emergency Planning: National 
Response Plan: “prevent further illness, injury, or death; restore calm; and engender confiden
in the operational response.”111 She said the recipients of the messages have their own set of 
objectives regarding recovering from a crisis. By way of finding a use for the ten (or twelve)
practices, she said that because of the constant availability of a huge variety of information 
today, it will be difficult for health communicators to manage communications during the next 
outbreak or emergency. Health risk communicators will n
ned best practices would be a good place to start. 
David Ropeik, an instructor in risk communication at the Harvard School of Public 
Health, added to the conversation, writing that fear and risk perception are the main factors that 
cause risk communication to be a special field. Because “evidence suggests that emotion plays 
more powerful role than fact-based analysis112” in shaping a fear response, he argued that risk
perception should be given primacy over other “best practices” in risk/crisis communication 
 
110 Robert L. Heath. “Best Practices in Crisis Communication: Evolution of Practice Through Research.” 
Journal of Applied Communication Research 24, no. 3 (2006): 245. 
111 Barbara Reynolds. “Response to Best Practices.” Journal of Applied Communication Research 24, no. 3 
(2006): 249. 
112 David Ropeik. “Best Practices Response.” Journal of Applied Communication Research.24, no. 3 (2006): 
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planning. Ropeik also recommended that risk and crisis communicators constantly monito
media, “both to learn what journalists have found and to correct immediately mistakes or 
inaccurate information.”
r the 
 He blamed FEMA’s poor response to Hurricane Katrina on their not 
followi
he 
 
n 
 
discussed the “expert heuristic” and how audiences perceive credibility in a message 
source. 
 
d the 
113
ng this practice.  
David Nelson, a senior scientific advisor with the CDC’s Office on Smoking and Health, 
discussed the folly of communicators assuming their information is important without doing t
audience research to find out what the audience wants and needs. In his editorial, “Reducing 
Information Pollution in the Internet Age,” which he wrote for the CDC e-journal Preventing 
Chronic Disease, he said that the recent availability of low-cost, broad reach communication
technology (e.g., the Internet) may distract communicators from the fundamentals, “such as 
understanding the intended audiences and how they seek, assess, and use information.”114 Nelso
warned against providing too much information, as it tends to confuse and daunt the audience.
He also 
Elias Arbrutyn commented on a panel discussion on scientific communication for a 1998
special issue of the CDC journal Emerging Infectious Diseases, saying that medical and health 
science information was once solely the domain of scientists and physicians, but today a much 
broader audience is interested. There is a big difference between what the scientists an
public know about medicine. He said that “physicians and scientists seek to transmit 
information,; the media, on the other hand, seek to entertain in addition to transmitting 
                                                 
113 Ibid., 256. 
114 David E. Nelson. “Reducing Information Pollution in the Internet Age.” Preventing Chronic Disease 4
1 (2007): 1–3. (CDC e-journal)
, no. 
. www.cdc.gov/pcd/issues/2007/jan/06_0119.htm. [Accessed 3 February 2007.] 
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information.”115 One of the panelists spoke of the advantages of writers putting events in 
historical perspective, while another said that “public health professionals cannot see their wor
in a historical light.”
k 
ed 
ble 
ge 
 should cultivate good sources and pick 
steward
r 
rs 
 
                                                
116 Arbrutyn recommended that both journalists and scientists consider 
historical perspective, both past history, and how the current event or information in question 
may factor into history in the future. He continued to say that the media and other writers task
with communicating scientific information “may make the scientific community uncomforta
with probing questions,” but that this questioning adds to the breadth of the perspective in a 
positive way. He concluded, “the session’s message was that scientists should view science 
writers as the scribes who can disseminate a story to the public by translating technical langua
into accessible terms. Scientists, like science writers,
s who will communicate the information accurately. The world wants to know about 
emerging threats to health, and writers can help.”117 
CDC researchers Freimuth, Linnan, and Potter pointed out that communication is an 
essential part of public health, and “in the absence of a cure…an effectively crafted and 
disseminated prevention message is the key control measure.”118 The authors wrote about thei
application of communication theory to focusing on new infectious disease threats. They autho
characterized past dissemination of health information as scientists “meticulously” recording
study results in scientific journals, leaving the media alone to interpret and transmit scientific 
information unaided. The authors identified reasons for heightened concern about effective 
messaging, including the increase in public desire for health information, the emergence of new 
 
115 Elias Arbrutyn. “Communicating Infectious Disease Information to the Public.” Emerging Infectious 
Diseases 4, no. 3 (1998): 470. 
116 Ibid. 
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118 Vicki S. Freimuth, Huan W. Linnan, and Polyxeni Potter. “Communicating the Threat of Emerging 
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diseases, the availability of a variety of information on the Internet, and the aging of the baby 
boomers. They called for a theory-based approach to maximize the effectiveness of their health 
wareness…place the 
issue o
 
 
 that infrastructure.120 It was through the 
anthrax
 
andoned by a government that had lost control of 
the situ
ty and 
Journal of 
communication response to the anthrax attacks. The issue consisted of 24 articles and 
                                                
messaging. They also identified the role of media coverage as to “create a
n the public agenda, and frame the way the issue is reported.”119 
Lessons Learned From the 2001 Anthrax Communication Response 
For what had been a typically isolated government science agency, the anthrax attacks in 
2001 were an important turning point at which the CDC became a more public-facing agency. 
Liana Blas Winett and Regina C. Lawrence wrote that the anthrax attacks “brought public health
into the media spotlight” and demonstrated to Americans the strength and weaknesses of both the
public health infrastructure and the policies that govern
 incident that CDC communications staffers learned the importance of being in control—
for both the physical and mental health of the public.  
The Bush administration (including its departments and agencies) was criticized for its 
response to the anthrax attacks. The press, the public, and public health and communication 
researchers complained that a secretive, slow, uncaring response allowed fear and panic to take
hold of the public. The public felt it had been ab
ation. Fortunately, some lessons were learned quickly, although researchers ruminated 
over the response for several years afterward.  
Authors from the CDC and elsewhere took advantage of this learning opportuni
contributed to a special September 2003 issue of the independent, non-CDC-affiliated 
Health Communication dedicated entirely to analyses of various aspects of the CDC’s 
 
119 Ibid., 342. 
120 Liana Blas Winett and Regina G. Lawrence, “The Rest of the Story: Public Health, the News, and the 2001 
Anthrax Attacks,” The Harvard International Journal of Press and Politics 10:3 (2005): 3. 
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commentaries, including a timeline of the anthrax case (September 18–November 30. 2001) tha
had been abstracted from a December 2001 New Yor
t 
k Times article.121 The issue was timed to 
coincid
 
 
nt 
munication, 
r is encouraged to go to the literature and websites [sic] they 
cite for
w York 
 
                                                
e with the second anniversary of the attacks. 
The Journal’s editor-in-chief Scott C. Ratzan explained the purpose of this special issue
as to analyze the “events and responses to the anthrax scare,” in the context that, in the case of 
large-scale emergency events, “ethical decision-making practices based on evidence and reason
have not always followed.” This special issue was also an opportunity to “articulate importa
challenges and approaches in our effort to better communicate public health information in 
general.”122 May G. Kennedy, from the Centers for Disease Control’s Office of Com
and the guest editor for the special issue, stated that some of the articles were “brief 
commentaries from public health professionals ranging from front-line communicators in 
affected sites to the then-director of the CDC,” Jeffrey Koplan. Kennedy stated that space 
constraints prevented the authors from being able to “develop or provide a great deal of support 
for the points they made. The reade
 further documentation.”123 
Vincent T. Covello, the director of the Center for Risk Communication in Ne
City, provided a checklist of seven “Best Practices in Public Health Risk and Crisis 
Communication,” and guidelines for these best practices. Guidelines included involving
stakeholders, being honest and open, meeting the needs of the media, coordination and 
collaboration with other credible sources, and communicating clearly and with compassion.124   
 
121 “Anthrax Case Timeline.” Abstracted with permission from “How the Cases Unfolded” (26 December 
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He stated that the 9/11 terrorist attacks and the anthrax attacks “have heightened public health 
agencies’ awareness of the need to enhance their risk and crisis communication skills.” He saw 
continuing threats of chemical and biological attacks as “a unique opportunity for public heal
agencies to assess
th 
 and elevate their level of communication preparedness for for all risk and 
crisis s
d 
h 
ed at 
 is 
y be judged “on the merits of the science and its clinical and public health 
usefuln
cities 
ter 
r 
                                                
cenarios.” 
Polyxeni Potter, who was then, and is as of this writing, the managing editor for the 
CDC’s Emerging Infectious Diseases journal, wrote of the importance of the quick response an
turnaround time that is now possible because of the Internet. (Emerging Infectious Diseases is 
published both in print and online.) She pointed to the “intentional release of biological agents” 
as having “changed the way journal articles are published, just as it has changed the public healt
response to outbreak investigations.” While she embraced the technology and the new spe
which information can be shared with the public, she questioned “how good is fast?” and 
cautioned against disseminating information before the time has been taken to ensure that it
accurate, verifiable, and scientifically valid. She concluded that an article that is published 
quickly must onl
ess.”125  
Marsha L. Vanderford, who has worked in several important communications capa
at the CDC, wrote of her experience in the Emergency Operations Center (EOC) after the 
anthrax attacks in “Communication Lessons Learned in the Emergency Operations Cen
During CDC’s Anthrax Response: A Commentary.”  She told of an incident in which 
doxycyclene was prescribed and distributed to postal workers at risk for anthrax in Octobe
2001; the initiative was met with public outcry because postal workers thought they were 
 
125 Polyxeni Potter. “Electronic Journal Publishing in the Age of Bioterrorism: How Fast is Fast?” Journal of 
Health Communication 8 (2003): 9–10. 
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receiving second-class treatment. It had widely publicized that those in the Hart (senate) buil
and at NBC had received Cipro, so even though doxycyclene was equally effective and had 
fewer side effects than Cipro, this had not been part of the messaging. They had neglected to
consider the beliefs of their target audience—something that could have been addressed via 
messaging—and had considered their message “in isolation” rather than in the context in which 
it was received. Vanderford points out that experts have analyzed this and similar situations, and
training has been provided to emergency communicators
ding 
 
 
 and 
 study, the tried-and-true 
researc
th, 
ose 
stem”) 
126, but a more reliable solution lies in 
constantly applying to risk communication the concepts the communication field has known
used for years.  Even though risk communication is a new field of
h on context and content in messaging remains important. 
David A. Shore, an associate dean at the Harvard University School of Public Heal
looked at the importance of trust in health communication (“Communicating in Times of 
Uncertainty: The Need for Trust”). He described the basic elements of trust as perceived 
competence (“how much one party believes the other party has the required expertise to perform 
the agreed-upon duties effectively and reliably”) and perceived conscience (“the extent to which 
one party believes that the other party intends to perform its agreed-upon activities and that th
activities really benefit the first party”).127 Public trust in doctors and the healthcare industry 
(Shore refers to the U.S. healthcare system as an “industry” rather than a true unified “sy
has waned in recent years, and that communication mistakes with the anthrax case were 
exemplary of the reasons why this is so. Shore described trust as “a reservoir of goodwill for 
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on 8 (2003): 13–14. Communicati
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future u
 
 the 
ly, she said that learning 
from pa n 
e 
ts on how 
on work during a 
se,”128 and that building trust is essential to health communication because the public 
isn’t qualified to judge the accuracy and importance of public health communications. 
Sandra Mullin, associate commissioner and director of communications at the New York
City Department of Health and Mental Hygiene, wrote of the merits of what she termed the 
“Giuliani Press Conference Model” of risk communication. Mullin described this as seemingly 
frequent press conferences post 9/11 in which New York City Mayor Rudy Giuliani, “flanked by 
other officials, stood clearly at the helm, displaying both empathy and mastery over information. 
As risk communication expert Peter Sandman would say, the mayor helped the city cope with
unbearable by bearing it himself.”129 She further described the sense of trust he was able to build 
during the aftermath of 9/11, and how this trust was useful during the anthrax case. She also 
credited a barrage of communications to different stakeholders, including an up-to-date Web site 
and rapid creation and broadcast of fact sheets and broadcast faxes. Final
st risk communication mistakes was critical, as that was how they learned the hard lesso
of how important it is to not dismiss the public’s fears as “illegitimate.” 
In “Uncertain Science and Certain Deadlines: CDC Responses to the Media During the 
Anthrax Attacks of 2001,” Robinson and Newstetter, researchers from the Georgia Institute of 
Technology, studied 19 communication professionals who worked on the CDC response to th
anthrax attacks. According to the abstract, “the interviews sought CDC staff viewpoin
the CDC handled a historically unprecedented level of press activity…Staff reported that the 
situation led to new work practices, tools for performing the work, and an enhanced 
understanding of what it takes to be prepared for and to handle communicati
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Communication Strategies That Helped.” Journal of Health Communication 8 (2003): 15–16. 
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terroris  
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(abstract).131 The article also 
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quests to 
is study suggest(ed) ways to improve future crisis 
                                                
m-related health crisis.”130 The authors believed these lessons can be applied by CDC and
other public health organizations to future crisis communication initiatives. 
CDC authors Prue et al. discussed CDC’s media monitoring system in “Communic
Monitoring: Shaping CDC’s Emergency Risk Communication Efforts.” The CDC’s monit
system enables the agency’s Office of Communication to monitor news media outlets for 
coverage of CDC issues. The CDC also uses the system to create and refine messages by 
identifying information gaps and opportunities. This system was expanded after 9/11 and the 
anthrax attacks “into a broader communication monitoring system, with both listening and tell
functions, to support CDC’s public health emergency response” 
ed day-to-day activities in the Office of Communication, and the actual experience of 
monitoring communications during a public health emergency. 
Mebane et al. compared CDC information releases and press coverage on the anthrax 
attacks for similarities or differences. The authors conducted a quantitative analysis of CDC 
information compared to media coverage in “Communicating Anthrax in 2001: A Comparison
CDC Information and Print Media Accounts.” The authors sampled and coded two months of 
news media and used statistical analysis to compare it to information released by CDC. They 
also conducted an in-depth, qualitative analysis of two anthrax-related issues. According to the 
abstract, “the quantitative analysis showed that, overall, the CDC information releases and the 
news coverage tracked fairly closely.” However, “the in-depth qualitative analysis sho
some reporters misinterpreted information provided by CDC but they responded to re
clarify the issue. The findings of th
 
ses 
: 35–49. 
130 Susan J. Robinson and Wendy C. Newstetter. “Uncertain Science and Certain Deadlines: CDC Respon
to the Media During the Anthrax Attacks of 2001.” Journal of Health Communication 8  (2003): 17–34. 
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commu
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ke advantage of them as well. The authors said the survey results would help facilitate 
two-wa ing 
 a 
diences in communication planning.” From the 
abstrac nd 
sk 
nication efforts and demonstrate how differing methods of analysis can yield 
substantially different results.”132 
Robert Blendon et al., in “Using Opinion Surveys to Track the Public’s Response t
Bioterrorist Attack,” recommended that public health communicators use surveys to determine
“what Americans know and believe, whom they trust, and what actions they are taking in 
response to the crisis.”133 They argued that the military and the media have used them to their 
benefit, as have organizations that conduct exit polls during elections, and that public health 
should ta
y communication, and could help guide officials and public health communicators dur
a crisis. 
William Pollard, of the CDC’s Office of Communication, also described surveys as
gauge of public opinion. He compared the data from national surveys before and after the 
anthrax attacks, and found that periodic attitude and opinion surveys can “provide timely, 
important information for understanding au
t, “the findings highlighted the importance of local television and radio and of cable a
network news as information sources.”134 
Rudd, et al. (2003) said communication is one of the most important tools to protect 
public health. In their case studies on specific, urgent government health communication 
campaigns (AIDS in 1988 and anthrax in 2001), they explored the specific challenges of ri
communication.  Risk communication usually comes with a much shorter timeline than a long-
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term campaign, and therefore presents special challenges with regard to planning, design, 
writing, and implementation. The authors explained basic health communication concepts such 
as literacy and risk, later going into more detail about the special considerations of risk 
communication. Despite the similarities in the situations addressed in these case studies, there 
were differences between the situations of their development: level of immediacy, time fram
and amount of pretesting. The authors find the AIDS piece to be
e, 
 much better tailored to the 
audien
e 
ost the 
erstanding of health information. They also provided statistics by way of explaining 
that “th
adequate, uniform definition of health literacy. They offered their own definition of health 
literacy as “the evolving skills and competencies needed to find, comprehend, evaluate, and use 
                                                
ce, the most important factor being that this piece considers the audience much more than 
does the anthrax piece. The authors maintain that plain language (and testing to help get the 
language right) is extremely important in risk communications. 
Parker and Gazmararian wrote of the importance of health literacy, which is the ability to 
not simply read, but comprehend, health information. They agreed with Rudd’s article in th
same journal issue, but believe that plain writing isn’t enough—efforts must be made to bo
public’s und
e people with the greatest health care needs in our country have the least ability to 
comprehend information required to successfully navigate and function in our health care 
system.”135 
Zaracadoolas et al. furthered the Parker and Gazmararian argument, quoting an esoteric, 
scientific passage describing anthrax bacteria as an example of the typically too-scientific 
anthrax information available to the public. They claim that many opportunities to communicate 
about the threat in a useful manner were lost because communicators were not working from an 
 
135 Ruth M. Parker and Julie A. Gazmararian. “Health Literacy: Essential for Health Communication.” Journal 
of Health Communication 8 (2003): 116. 
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health information and concepts to make educated choices, reduce health risks, and improve 
quality of life.”136 They advocated use of this definition in order to make the public more health 
literate
 to report 
ed a list of questions they can use to determine whether 
informa
ning, and cooperation goals for the 
U.S. go
t during the 
                                                
, and therefore increase the effectiveness of health communications. 
Jamieson et al., of the University of Pennsylvania’s Annenberg School, raised some 
questions about the propriety of journalistic reporting of details and hypotheticals in the case of 
terrorist attack. Among the questions they said journalists137 should ponder is whether
information that terrorists could use, and when is it responsible to report hypothetical 
information. In response, they provid
tion needs to be reported.138 
Payne and Schulte focused on the fact that much of the health information the public 
receives is mediated, and that the goals of the mass media and health communicators are not 
always the same. They can be valuable partners or “forceful foes.” The authors referred to a 
perpetuation of misinformation and mistrust in the aftermath of the anthrax attacks, which the 
authors said could have been avoided if public health officials, namely the surgeon general, had 
shown adequate leadership. As for the media, the authors said “people providing information to 
the public have a responsibility to report accurate health information, especially in the event of 
an emergency,” and to that end, proposed a set of ethics, trai
vernment, public health officials, and the media.139  
Kay Golan, who was the director of the CDC’s Media Relations departmen
anthrax attacks offered advice on “Surviving a Public Health Crisis.” She advised 
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communicators to plan and practice taking care of yourself, the work, family—everything—in 
case of a public health crisis. She said to build relationships now that communicators can use in 
case of an emergency. No matter how disruptive the emergency, the public will still count on the 
officials and their organizations for the same things they always have, so the organization’s core
functions should be recognized and adhered to. She said that the public will want to know, and
they have a right to; that the media will constantly want updates, and they have a right to that
too. Response to these needs sho
 
 
 
uld be planned in advance of an emergency, because being 
timely 
ing to 
0  
d on 
e 
“public health workforce” to communicate effectively. Their primary method of attaining that 
                                                
and accurate is difficult. 
Courtney et al. described communication is “a relatively new discipline in the field of 
public health,” but that CDC has created and implemented training programs for emergency risk 
communication (such as CDCynergy). Agencies and other organizations focused their efforts on 
epidemiology, non-communication-related prevention efforts (e.g., immunization), and providing 
scientific information to health professionals and other scientists. Scientists counted on the press 
to figure out what was important, and communicate that information to the public. Accord
the authors, it was AIDS and other emergent diseases that awakened CDC to the fact that 
“communicating clearly to the public was…a necessary component of public health practice.”14
In 1993, under agency director William Roper, the CDC formed the Office of Communication 
(OC). The OC was responsible for “crafting and delivering messages and strategies, base
consumer research, to promote the health of individuals and communities.”141 The OC’s 
overarching goal was to build national capacity for health communication efforts by training th
 
140 Judith Courtney, Galen Cole, and Barbara Reynolds. “How the CDC is Meeting the Training Demands of 
Emergency Risk Communication.” Journal of Health Communication. 8 (2003): 128. 
141 Ibid. 
46 
goal was through their CDCynergy course142, which offers a systematic, organized way to plan, 
create, and implement health communications and social marketing campaigns.  
However, the Anthrax attacks in 2001 called for a quicker response than anything for 
which CDCynergy training had prepared people. This forced CDC to realize that they needed to 
broaden their scope when considering whom to train in public health communication. The 
Anthrax attacks ushered in a new focus on risk and crisis communication.143 Their experience 
led them to create the ERC (Emergency Risk Communication) CDCynergy training program
prepare public health officials to respond quickly in time of any crisis that could affect public 
health. Courtney et al. worked at the CDC at the time of the article’s authorship, and they 
recommended expanding ERC CDCynergy training to include community leaders and local 
officials. They said that including a number of local leaders would improve rapport and 
communication with the affected community.
 to 
                                                
144  
Salmon et al. wrote of a survey intended to assess Michigan corporate spokespersons’ 
awareness of and preparedness for a bioterrorism attack. The survey was begun on September 
10, 2001 and continued through October 2001 (the first anthrax attack occurred on September 
18), and is therefore described as providing an “unusually timely snapshot” of bioterrorism 
awareness. According to the article abstract, “the results offer evidence of a robust optimistic 
bias” as well. The authors warned that this optimistic bias could result in corporate America145 
overestimating its level of preparedness.146 
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Jeffrey Koplan, who was the director of the CDC at the time of the anthrax attacks, but 
who had left for Emory University by the time this journal issue was published, wrote a brief 
commentary on “Communication During Public Health Emergencies.” He focused on the 
similarities and differences between communication during a personal health emergency and a 
public health crisis. He pointed out that when a person is in an automobile accident, for example, 
there is a team of medical professionals focusing on the needs of that one person, and the 
victim’s family does not necessarily expect a constant stream of information from the medical 
team. On the other hand, in a modern public health crisis, millions of people expect a continuous 
flow of information from the health officials. Koplan said the latter was not previously the case, 
and he said that it was the 2001 anthrax attacks that caused this shift in the relationship between 
the public and health officials. Audiences and their roles are now more diverse and complex; this 
combined with the constant judgment calls, the volume of information, and the variety of media 
used to communicate this information can make communicating public health information quite 
a challenge.  
Peter Sandman, a risk communication consultant who acted as an advisor to the CDC 
during the anthrax response, wrote that while he found the issue’s previous 22 articles to be 
useful and practical, he was struck by the lack of focus on policy. He worried that the “tough 
communication policy questions tend to get subordinated to the important but not-so-painful 
logistical and procedural ones.”147 He continued to say that it is tempting to believe “that once 
the scientists have decided what is happening and what to do about it, all we communication 
folks need to do is get the word out.”148 Communication professionals have more work to do 
than that, and more work to do than message tailoring, monitoring, and similar aspects of the 
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communication field. He said there is a real policy debate that still needs to occur in order for 
health communicators to be truly prepared. 
The “Epilogue to the Special Issue on Anthrax” was provided by Vicki Freimuth. She 
called for continued dialogue, and said “communication is no panacea for terrorist health threats, 
but effective communication can help minimize the damage done in this kind of crisis and 
mobilize preparedness efforts.”149 
Review of Public Relations and Risk/Crisis Communication Literature Written by 
Non-CDC Authors  
Communication researchers Carl H. Botan and Maureen Taylor reviewed the foundation 
and current state of theoretical public relations research, noting that the field itself is relatively 
young at 25 years150. They also noted that although it has its own distinct body of work as a 
subfield of communication studies, (as the abstract stated) “(t)he field of public relations is 
developing into a theoretically based area of applied communication that has the potential to 
inform several areas of communication/mass communication and to offer theoretic and 
conceptual tools useful in health, risk, and political communication, among others.”151 Botan and 
Taylor wrote of the purely functional beginnings of public relations research, saying that the 
field is evolving “to a perspective that focuses on communication as a meaning-making process,” 
a dialogue, in which the audience plays an active part.152 The authors also discussed the idea that 
issues do not simply appear suddenly, but that they have a relatively predictable life cycle that 
can be managed to some degree. 
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Then-executive vice president and general manager of American Newspaper 
Representatives, Inc., Warren Grieb told the Georgia Press Institute in 1963, that public relations 
is “personal selling—personality, promotion, publicity, communications, utilization of all 
resources, both human and otherwise, to further and enhance a better image of a product, service, 
company, or group of companies, in the eyes of the public.”153 He told them, “Select your 
personnel carefully, especially the ones who meet the public. Their personality, their warmth, 
their friendliness, their willingness to help, their dress, and their appearance have…much to do 
with creating a favorable impression…”154 
Media advocacy is a concept tied closely to public relations. One way to look at it is that 
organizations in power use public relations to relate to the public. The public, via grassroots 
and/or community-based organizations, can use media advocacy as a tool to influence how the 
powerful organizations wield that power. The CDC certainly engages in public relations, but its 
programs also encourage grassroots activism and media advocacy to enable communities to meet 
their local public health goals. Also, though the CDC is powerful, it relies on policymakers for 
its funding and mandates, and at times clearly attempts to influence them, and to influence their 
public to influence the policymakers as well. 
Lawrence Wallack described the purpose of media advocacy (at least in a public health 
setting) as being “to use the media strategically to apply pressure for changes in policy to 
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promote public health goals.”155 He also said media advocacy provides a “framework” for 
shifting the discussion from the health consequences of individual behaviors to the health 
implications of policy and environment.156 These effects are similar to the ones seen in episodic 
and thematic framing. 
Michael Palenchar and Robert Heath summarized the evolution and current sate of risk 
communication research, describing risk communication as a collaborative process. Their 2007 
article was written from the perspective of preparedness for terrorist threats to infrastructure, of 
risk caused by long-term environmental damage, and of risk related to living near or working at a 
hazardous materials facility. These all fall under the umbrella of public health concerns, and 
share much in common with health risk communication. Palenchar and Heath shared their 
insights gained from a decade of research in the field, including that “ideas and meaning count;” 
transparency is important to effective relationships and requires active participation by 
stakeholders; collaboration is essential to building trust; uncertainty is a reality risk 
communicators must endure; risk communications are part of a dialogue (with the public and 
other stakeholders) and a narrative; and risk communications help inform a functioning society 
to make decisions. The authors said risk communication should not have public relations as its 
objective, nor should it attempt to simply reassure the public. Risk communication, they said, 
should be approached as a “constructive dialogue that legitimately addresses risk assessment, 
abatement, policy, and communication.”157 Lastly, the authors said that risk communication is 
easier to plan than it is to implement.  
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 Journalist and author Madeline Drexler wrote specifically about problems with getting 
information from the CDC’s leadership, researchers, and spokespeople, which, she said, in pre-
September 11 times, was much easier to do. Writing in 2003, she said, “in order to converse with 
someone at the CDC, a reporter must now make a formal request, which can take weeks to be 
processed through a complex public affairs filtration system that reaches all the way 
to…Washington, D.C.”158 She asked whether the huge increases in preparedness funding were 
actually improving what she described as “the daily, unpublicized tide of disease,” including the 
spread of West Nile virus, antibiotic-resistant microbes, contaminated poultry, and vaccine-
preventable diseases, in addition to bioterrorism. She then asked, in five years, “if journalists are 
still struggling just to talk with authorities in the know, how will the public ever find out” if real 
improvements have been made?159 
Sooyoung Cho used a survey of health public relations professionals to study power 
relationships in public relations; he said that much attention had already been paid to the “great 
power…granted to the mass media in terms of selecting and framing messages…However, 
because of the complex nature of the subject and the need for specialized expertise, the health 
beat is one in which reporters rely on a source’s expertise and public relations efforts.”160 This 
reliance, coupled with the relationships health PR practitioners frequently develop with health 
beat reporters, often gives the health PR practitioners “expert power.” Cho recommended, among 
other things, further qualitative research and content analysis of the news coverage the health 
organizations receive. 
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Cho and Cameron furthered Cho’s earlier study of power in public relations, this time 
using a survey to examine four factors that effect the perception of expert power: “personal 
closeness with reporters, openness towards (sic) the media, perceived media job performance, 
and perceived expertise in the health field.”161 Cho’s review of the literature indicated that 
“public relations practitioners appear to play an important role in health news reporting as a 
mediator between journalists and scientific fields such as medicine.”162 
Scott Ratzan, editor of the Journal of Health Communication, wrote an editorial in 2003 
about the communication challenge presented (mainly to the World Health Organization, or 
WHO) by the SARS outbreak. Ratzan empathized with the WHO for the challenges they faced 
as they had to determine how best to “place SARS in perspective by exhibiting clear concern, 
caution, and the means for controlling the spread of SARS”163 while also trying to control the 
spread of the fear. Ratzan pointed out that when the public focuses on the wrong thing, they 
divert their attention from, and communicators are forced to divert resources from, other threats 
that are more constant or deadly, such as “HIV/AIDS, malaria, TB, and diarrheal disease.” For 
the obstacles to effective health communication, Ratzan blamed both the profusion of unofficial 
and/or mediated sources, including members of the public itself, and “the growing lack of public 
trust in experts (particularly scientists), policy-makers, and politicians.”164 Ratzan also said that 
the public often erroneously blames the messengers for the mistakes of the public officials and 
experts. To solve this, Ratzan proposed that health communicators tailor their information for 
certain specific audiences, including the general public, patients, and caregivers. 
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Veil et al. wrote of factors affecting the public relations work done in response to the 
hepatitis A outbreak that sickened 660 people at a Pennsylvania Chi-Chi’s restaurant. As if the 
health crisis were not bad enough, Chi-Chi’s had to maintain an appearance of legitimacy, 
character, and competence in the face of the additional fact that its parent company had declared 
Chapter 11 bankruptcy shortly before the outbreak was traced to Chi-Chi’s. The authors stated 
that Chi-Chi’s demonstrated competence—they had passed their recent health inspections with a 
score of 100, and they reassured the public that the outbreak hadn’t extended beyond that one 
Chi-Chi’s restaurant. However, the company didn’t demonstrate the character (empathy, regret, 
compassion, and concern) that the victims wanted. Veil et al. recommend a crisis communication 
plan to ensure effective communications in case of a crisis, and that a “balanced mixture of 
competence and character ” can help a company regain its legitimacy.165 
Much research concludes that applying plain language principles is an effective way to 
eliminate potentially confusing scientific and medical jargon, and make health information 
available to the public. Kickbush and Ratzan cited an estimate of $73 billion lost annually to low 
health literacy, including the consequences of misunderstanding patient information.166 But 
rather than focusing on the concept of literacy in general, which connotes more responsibility on 
the part of the reader, they concluded that the federal government should work harder to reach 
the public. Factors such as embarrassment and information overload interfere with the 
consumer’s attainment of health literacy skills. Kickbush and Ratzan also found fault in a general 
lack of systematic response to issues that can be construed to fall outside the responsibilities of 
                                                 
165 Shari R. Veil, Min Liu, Sheri L Erickson, and Timothy L. Sellnow. “Too Hot to Handle: Competency 
Constrains Character in Chi-Chi’s Green Onion Crisis.” Public Relations Quarterly (Winter 2005): 19–22. 
166 Ilona  Kickbush and Scott C. Ratzan. “Health Literacy: Making a Difference in the USA.”  
Journal of Health Communication 6 (2001): 87–88. 
54 
one government agency or another. They also faulted a lack of awareness of the positive 
economic impact of a health-educated public. 
Rudd and Kaphingst, et al., used their case study on federally-mandated clean water 
information, to document and examine a health literacy team’s process of rewriting this 
information. They provided methods (multiple, to make up for deficiencies in existing methods) 
and an explanation of the steps used in the rewriting process, in order that it may serve as a guide 
for others. They conclude that the case was successful, and that public health researchers and 
practitioners should take responsibility and look to the commercial sector for ideas.167 
Genova interviewed Jason Kravitz, the communications director of Direct Relief 
International, an international relief agency, discussing internal and external communication 
strategies developed by that agency for disaster response. The author was mainly interested in 
the business communications applications and similarities, but many of the concepts and 
practices Kravitz described are applicable to any kind of emergency or risk communication. He 
talked about the writing process, communication structure, and command chain used in getting 
messages to their target populations.168 
Tanner said the proliferation of health news today is in response to “the appetite of media 
consumers.”169 This increases the pressure and burden on public health communicators and 
media relations staff, who, she said, are familiar with the fact that many of their stories never 
make it to print (or the air, or the Internet); the messages that do get picked up by the news media 
are often misinterpreted or distorted. These distortions, in turn, lower the credibility of the health 
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information the public receives from the media. Turner conducted a study that found that the 
media were uneducated in the health, medicine, and science fields upon which they were 
reporting. This lack of knowledge, combined with the pressure to fill much time with health 
news, contributed to reliance on the community for health news sources. Turner recommended 
that media relations professionals form relationships with these community health sources, and 
provide community members and experts to provide interesting examples and interview subjects 
for stories. Further, Turner recommended that media relations professionals think in terms of 
providing sound bites and being mindful of reporters’ deadlines.  
In Public Relations Quarterly’s “Superstar PR” column, Ronald Levy wrote about 
organizations creating and preserving public goodwill, and protecting the public health at the 
same time, by actively providing health information (specifically that which is beneficial to the 
organization) to the media. Examples he provided include Microsoft sharing information about 
their corporate fitness program, and GlaxoSmithKline “helping the public beat a serious ailment 
many people don’t know about.”170 Further, Levy said, some organizations have enjoyed success 
with “preventive PR,” distributing press releases that attempt to frame emerging issues as they 
emerge, and steer the discussion in a direction beneficial to their organization. Levy 
recommended organizations seek opportunities to conduct such PR activities whenever possible, 
to encourage “an outpouring of public gratitude”171 and “make the public less critical of an 
organization.”172 
Coombs, who has written several books on crisis communication, focused mainly on 
corporate crises, but his principles can be applied to risk and crisis communication from any 
organization. In Ongoing Crisis Communication, he addresses crisis communication from 
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assessing risks and pre-crisis planning to sensing potential crisis situations, all the way through 
the execution of a crisis response. Among the important points he made is to identify multiple 
spokespeople and train them before any hint of a crisis,173 to create a crisis response plan,174 to 
rehearse the crisis response, and to refine the response plan based on lessons learned when 
conducting the rehearsal.175 Coombs described crisis communication as being reflexive: 
responders should monitor the media response to their crisis response. He also provided a section 
on determining which situations called for which communication response strategy, e.g., 
apology, denial, excuse, or attack.176  
Several years later, Coombs, along with co-author Sherry Holladay published It’s Not 
Just PR, which discussed public relations from a variety of perspectives. Rather than explaining 
the “how-to” of the public response, the authors explored issues such as common critiques of 
public relations, ethical responsibilities of public relations, public relations in academia, the 
evolution of the field, and how public relations affects society—often undetected. Among the 
ideas they discussed is public relations as public communication, which therefore has ethical 
responsibilities to serve both the client and the public.177 
A Review of Journalistic Best Practices 
Good public health journalism is good journalism. The specifics may differ between a 
health beat and another, like sports or city government beats, but the basics of good reporting are 
the same no matter what the subject. Walter Grieb, a PR professional, offered what he considered 
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a best practice for the members of the press. He said that readers come from every demographic, 
but what they have in common is that “they look to you, believe in you, and rely on you for a full 
reporting of all the news”178  
Public Health journalism 
 The best health reporters aren’t necessarily scientists, but reporters who rigorously follow 
the best practices of their own craft of journalism. Lewis Cope, a former science reporter and 
former president of the National Association of Science Writers, said that reporters didn’t need 
to be experts on the “scientific answers,” but that “their job obligates them to ask the right 
questions.”179  He discussed how “tricky” it can be to be clear when reporting medical research 
findings, but that it is important, and that journalists have a public health duty to inform the 
public.180 He said reporters should employ the “journalistic instincts” of “healthy skepticism and 
good questioning”181 both to avoid being led astray, and to avoid misleading news consumers.  
 Cope listed a number of recommendations to help medical reporters avoid common 
pitfalls. He said reporters should feel free to use findings from less rigorous studies if they seem 
important, but they must question the meaning of those findings.182 He pointed out that average 
figures don’t always provide an accurate portrayal of a situation and that costs of treatment and 
medication are important to readers.183 He also said that when research findings disagree with 
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current scientific knowledge and assumptions, this can be important, but that there is a huge 
burden that must be met when changing the scientific status quo.184  
 Cope further warned that numbers can mislead both reporters and the public. He 
specifically referred to the ongoing debate over the causes of autism to make his point that “even 
with impressive numbers, association doesn’t prove causation.”185 He admonished reporters who 
speculate that vaccines cause autism, saying that their lack of thoroughness and lack of 
adherence to journalistic best practices may result in unnecessary illness and death, as parents 
may delay having their children immunized based on what they read in the news. He said that in 
these stories, “the missing figures are the tolls these childhood diseases took before vaccines 
were available.”186 While he acknowledged that sometimes small numbers can tell a big story, he 
also said that “(r)eaders…should also know that science looks at the statistical probability of 
what’s true. Few, if any, new treatments would ever reach patients if proof-positive were 
required. Many, many lives would be lost.”187  
 Uncertainty is a given in research—otherwise there would be no research to conduct—
and Cope encouraged reporters to help set proper expectations for the understanding of scientific 
information. He recommended that reporters “remind readers about the certainty of some 
uncertainty.”188 He gave changing nutrition standards as an example of a research area news 
consumers find particularly frustrating, and said that “(i)n the eyes of some, these and other flip-
flops give science a bad name. Actually, this is science working just as it is supposed to work, 
and it helps if we, as reporters, include this in our stories.”189 Health and medical reporters need 
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to remind readers that science has not failed simply because researchers don’t know all of the 
answers yet. 
 Having been both a medical reporter and a practicing medical doctor, Perri Klass has 
experienced both sides of the doctor-journalist relationship. She wrote about some of the issues 
medical reporters face, including lack of training and editorial pressure to make a story more 
interesting or compelling by conflation, exaggeration, or even killing off a patient.190 She also 
discussed the need to protect patient privacy and confidentiality, which may require drastically 
changing a patient’s identifiable attributes. (While this is probably necessary, doing so would 
theoretically interfere with the truth of a story.)  
 Klass said that “everyone brings to the job a complex mix of prejudice and experience 
and the desire to tell a good story, along with a set of standards.”191 She acknowledged that she 
admired journalistic ideals of “pure freedom and objectivity,”192 and that the label of “reputable 
medical journalist…carries a specific conscious and conscientious identity”193 that she 
sometimes “inhabited.” However, she said she found the diagnostic judgment—the 
subjectivity—of a doctor to be useful in journalism, and that it is possible to embrace that and 
make it part of the story. 
 Medical editor Ragnar Levi said that medical reporters should probe, verify, and 
generally “work to separate scientific fact from science fiction.”194 Levi described a number of 
common pitfalls, including failure to ask sources to fully explain findings and numbers or 
substantiate evidence, resorting to “he-said-she-said” accounts, assuming research results 
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directly affects clinical practice, and under- or overstating risk.195 He acknowledged certain 
pressures reporters face, including the temptation to report on unusual cases and deadline 
pressures.196   
Levi said that in-depth scientific knowledge is not necessary for good medical 
reporting—but that a few other things were, namely, “basic knowledge of a few scientific ground 
rules,…common sense, and a whole lot of healthy skepticism.”197 He recommended “four key 
questions” to guide reporters to the real answers: “Is the claim valid? Where is the evidence? Is 
the evidence strong and relevant? How can the news be reported fairly and accurately?”198 
Knowing where to find additional research sources quickly can help a reporter avoid mistakes 
caused by deadline pressures, and reporters can avoid misleading the public by noting when a 
case is unusual.199 Further, he recommends that journalists question a source’s ability to make an 
expert claim, the reliability of the methods, and whether the source stands to gain from the 
publicity that may result from news coverage.200 Like Cope, he points out that “correlation is not 
causation.”201 
Recommendations on best practices for journalists are important, but some 
recommendations, like proper training, may be out of reach even for the journalists that want to 
follow them. Melinda Voss had been a reporter for 26 years before pursuing a master’s degree in 
public health, and while in school she was dismayed to hear her professors harshly criticize 
health journalists and their stories for being “careless, unscientific, inadequate, or unfair.”202 
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Voss agreed that an untrained health press can “wreak havoc” and confuse the public203 because 
research repeatedly shows that the public relies heavily on the media for health information.204 
She said press coverage at an early stage of an unfolding health issue or of research on a health 
topic may mislead the public into believing that “the data are in fact mature, the methods valid, 
and the findings widely accepted.”205 
However, she mentioned “how little preparation and on-the-job-training journalists 
typically receive” for covering complex medical issues, and that these journalists “know they 
lack proficiency and want help.”206 She cited a survey she had conducted of 115 Midwestern 
health journalists, with 83% of respondents stating they had received no training at all 
specifically pertaining to reporting on health issues.207 Furthermore, “more than two-
thirds…identified four skills—understanding key health issues, putting health news in context, 
producing balanced stories on deadline, and interpreting statistics—as troublesome.”208  
 Unfortunately, accurate, effective health journalism requires a specialized skill set, and 
reporters are unlikely to receive the training they need to obtain these skills. Voss said that unlike 
reporters on other beats, health reporters “need skills and knowledge not easily acquired on the 
job.”209 However, she said newspapers spend very little on professional development when 
compared with other industries, providing less training than the journalists want or need.210 
Additionally, she said the available training programs may be inadequate; few programs address 
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“such journalism fundamentals as how to interview health and medical researchers or how to 
report medical research,” and the existing programs could benefit from outside evaluation.211 
Additional recommendations to journalists from medical and health professionals include 
more coverage of the health care system and health policy environment,212 more in-depth, 
thoughtful coverage of complex issues such as the state of U.S. health insurance,213 and—
surprisingly—that journalists demand more out of health researchers.214 Mebane said journalists 
and researchers should get together and “discuss what news the public wants to and needs to 
know,” and that such conversations could lead to better reporting and increased cooperation from 
the experts. Mebane said that “journalists provide a valuable service to the public” by reporting 
on health issues and the health system, as they provide the most effective means of 
communicating such important information.215 
Journalistic Best Practices With Regard to Public Relations 
Even if they don’t collaborate to the degree Mebane suggested, public health officials and 
their public relations staffs need to recognize the benefits of a relationship with the press, or at 
least the importance of getting coverage on important health issues. The press helps public health 
communicators get their message out in an effective, economical way (although sometimes the 
information in a press release can be changed drastically in the resulting article). The very fact 
that the message is mediated, rather than coming straight from a government spokesperson, can 
often lend needed credence to a message. Press coverage can also help raise awareness of an 
issue to the point that the message source, or the agency that can address the issue—both of 
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which can describe the CDC in the case of a public health issue—can benefit from additional 
funding, power, and visibility. 
Journalists and public relations practitioners have long had a troubled, yet symbiotic, 
relationship. Herbert Strentz, a journalism professor and veteran reporter, said that tradition 
holds that public relations “conjures two mental images for veteran reporters: the press release 
and the waste basket.” However, Strentz said the reality is that public relations provides a 
“subsidy of information” that the reporters appreciate and use.216 He acknowledged that despite 
the usefulness of reporters and PR personnel to each other, the relationship harbors some distrust. 
While PR personnel help journalists fill their need for information, journalists also know they are 
being “used” to some extent. Additionally, reporters may receive inaccurate or incomplete 
information from PR personnel, or they may harbor a grudge for telephone calls and emails 
never returned (or returned too late for deadline),217 being kept waiting for interviews, or not 
being given access to the people the reporter thinks are important or appropriate for a story.   
Strentz further described why the relationship is this way, saying, “relatively few news 
reporters think of public relations in terms of the Public Relations Society of America,” which 
puts great effort into education, accreditation, disclosure, and improving industry standards, but 
that they are “likely to remember…the corporate president hiding poor earnings in the last 
paragraph of a four-page news release, or the public relations director who denied a merger just 
hours before it was formally announced.”218 
Edward Lordan claims that part of the reason Americans currently have a negative view 
of public relations is that the Bush administration contributed greatly to this blurring of lines, and 
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that the public and the press have both become wary of it. He cites $250,000,000 spent on public 
relations efforts in four years, granting press access to non-journalistic party supporters, the 
video news release (VNR) scandal, and paying press members to support the administration’s 
positions and actions. However, rather than laying all the blame at the feet of the Bush 
administration, Lordan admonished both the public relations practitioners and the press members 
involved for their participation, especially in the latter example, saying that both the Public 
Relations Society of America (PRSA) as well as “every responsible media organization in 
America” have codes of ethics that forbid these actions. “You don’t pay to get stories placed, and 
you don’t accept payments to place them.”219 
Lordan said there were several reasons for the blurred lines between public relations and 
the press: they work with similar methods, tools, jargon, and deadlines, and work closely and 
often in a symbiotic sort of relationship. However, he said that maintaining a clear separation 
between the two was essential to the credibility of both fields. He delineated their roles thusly: 
“The role of the public relations professional is to help his or her client develop and sustain 
relationships with key publics by presenting the most favorable, but still completely truthful, 
information. The role of the press is to report what is going on to help keep the public 
informed.”220 
Karla K. Gower described different aspects of the relationship between reporters and 
public relations workers. She said that journalists often view themselves as watchdogs of 
established institutions and as protectors of the underdog. “By adopting the watchdog metaphor,” 
she wrote, “the media put themselves into an adversarial position vis-à-vis the institutions of 
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government, business, and in some cases, religion.”221 Gower said that while journalists felt 
hampered by businesspeople lying or telling half-truths; businesspeople felt reporters were out to 
get them.222 Gower noted that some corporations retaliated against what they felt was negative 
coverage, boycotting some papers and taking out full-page ads in others to get their versions of a 
story out.223 Martin Meyer of the Harvard Business School described the adversarial relationship 
another way: “In the end the essence of reporting is finding out what the players wish to keep 
secret, and why, and what the secrets mean.” 224 
However, Meyer acknowledged that the relationship was symbiotic, saying “government 
badly needs the attention of the news purveyors.”225“in the absence of news it would be difficult 
for people to find out what the government is doing, and impossible for them to find out what the 
government thinks it is doing.” However, he described “the symbiosis between press and 
government” as “deeply troubled.”226 
Authors featured in the Spring and Summer 2003 volumes of the Nieman Report 
appeared to agree on best practices for health and medical beat reporters. They presented these 
practices as well as tips for reporters, public relations organizations, and even news consumers in 
their articles. Several of the authors also agreed that training for health and medical reporters was 
important, but lacking.  
 Some best practices came from journalists who worked with public health officials on 
stories. Sanjay Bhatt, the Palm Beach Post’s lead reporter on the anthrax attack story in 2001, 
shared lessons learned from his experience. He recommends paying attention, investigating, and 
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storing information so that reporters have information and context on which to ask questions of 
official sources if or when a disaster strikes. In his words, “plan ahead of the event, as you would 
for a natural disaster.”227 He pointed out the uncertainty when addressing a potential bioterrorism 
incident and implored reporters to “do your job, but don’t be reckless,” rushing onto a scene 
without considering that the undetermined agent could also sicken reporters and make them 
unwitting parts of the story.228 His recommendation with regard to official statements was to 
report them, “then explain what they don’t say.”229  
 Bhatt also wrote of the pressures that can drive a reporter to resort to non-expert sources. 
Using the example of the anthrax attacks, he describes “the pressure to feed readers fresh angles” 
as “unrelenting,” even when there were no new developments to report.230 He lamented that 
coverage of atypical stories, like unusual drug reactions to the Cipro people at risk were taking, 
may have unnecessarily frightened people away from preventive measures, but defends his 
decision to consult other sources because official sources simply had not made themselves 
available to reporters. “I had no choice,” he said. In contrast to the access he had previously had 
at the CDC, “the federal government had imposed a news blackout for several days, and gagged 
state and local officials. Calls, faxes, and e-mails to the federal agencies went unanswered.”231 
Furthermore, people in crisis want and need information, and they “can’t be expected to sit still 
until the next press conference.”232 On the other hand, Bhatt acknowledges that it may be 
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socially irresponsible for public officials and reporters to admit they don’t know anything and/or 
don’t have a handle on the situation.233 
 Others in the press found fault with the way the CDC handled the press and controlled 
information. Health writer and editor Patricia Thomas wrote about the interaction between 
journalists and the CDC (and other federal agencies) in the wake of the anthrax attacks, assessing 
“what went wrong.”234 She said there was a struggle between journalists seeking information 
about the anthrax attacks and the government agencies that “held a near monopoly” on that 
information.235 Journalists claimed—in print—that “usually helpful press officers were 
stonewalling, government scientific experts were not being made available for interviews, and 
public officials were generally failing to make accurate health information available fast 
enough.”236  
However, Thomas said that she and other reporters didn’t blame the CDC. They blamed 
the Bush administration for creating an “information shortfall” that bred panic, fear, and 
confusion in the U.S. public, by exerting “tight government control of health and science news,” 
by ordering the CDC and NIH not to talk without permission from the White House, and for 
“mismanagement of news (that) harmed the public good.”237 Thomas also blamed inadequate 
staffing at the CDC to handle the thousands of anthrax- and bioterrorism-related calls the CDC’s 
media office alone received during the first two weeks of the crisis. 238 In the meantime, news 
outlets were resorting to seeking information from self-proclaimed experts and poorly-informed 
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local health officials, resulting in further confusion as a number of outlets spread erroneous 
information, including referring to the anthrax bacterium as the “anthrax virus.” 239  
 Two weeks after the attacks, Thomas said “HHS leadership realized that the public 
needed more information from credible medical experts,” and changed the way the CDC was 
responding to reporters. The CDC media relations staff issued press releases and a video news 
release from then-director Koplan, staffed their press office with 15 media relations specialists 
working in shifts, and posted additional information on the CDC Web site in Spanish as well as 
English.240 She said this was helpful, and that the CDC continued to make improvements in how 
it provided the news media with information. 
 Thomas recommended several measures to avoid anthrax-attack-style confusion in the 
case of future disasters. She cited risk communication best practices, saying that government 
agencies should prepare fact sheets and a list of experts ready to distribute so accurate 
information can be disseminated quickly. In order to prevent misinformation from reaching, 
confusing, and frightening the public, she said “crisis communications experts emphasize that 
credible doctors and scientists should be talking to the press from the start and should be 
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available on a schedule that suits today’s 24-hour news cycle so that less reliable speakers will be 
shut out.”241  
 M. A. J. McKenna, a reporter for the Atlanta Journal-Constitution, the same Maryn 
McKenna who authored Beating Back the Devil (referenced earlier in this study), wrote in a 
Nieman Reports article that public health is an important beat because it “help(s) news 
organizations interpret major developments in defense, health policy, international relations, 
medical advances, and community needs.”242 As such, public health requires a special set of 
skills including familiarity with math, politics, budgets, science, epidemiology, and the ability to 
see these things as part of a broader context. She said a public health reporter needed to be 
willing to do “painstaking reporting” to “associate…numbers with actual victims.” 243 She 
recommended asking “to prove significance and accuracy, what questions must we ask?” and 
embracing the rigorous, dramatic, mystery-novel nature of public health reporting in order to 
rescue it from the perception that it must be “dull but important.”244 
The Relationship of Journalism and Public Relations With Framing 
Framing is a device that both the press and the public use to make sense of the world. In 
the way of journalistic best practices, Meyer said that a reporter must be able to make sense out 
of what he or she is reporting, and to understand those issues from multiple viewpoints. He said, 
“The greatness of the New York Times derives…from a…struggle to acquire the expertise 
necessary to broaden, sharpen, and deepen the perceptual apparatus of the institution” of 
journalism.245  
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However, Meyer acknowledged that the realities of working in the newspaper medium 
can work against reporters trying to produce the best possible journalism. He said, “Under 
deadline pressure, the first cut at imposing pattern on observation rarely exposes the heart of the 
matter.”246  
The structure of a newspaper’s daily operations may lend itself more to unintentional or 
subtle influence rather than directly trying to control portrayal of events. Niblock described 
newspapers as having a complex organizational structure with many interdependencies as well as 
a hectic and relentless deadline and print schedule. She portrayed the daily schedules of many 
different people who touch each editorial piece as they multi-task their way through the work 
day: conducting research and interviews, visiting event scenes, reacting to breaking news, 
writing the stories, editing, managing employees, and dealing with coworkers’ overlapping 
schedules in a 24-hour newsroom.247   
Several authors gave different examples in which an increase in crime reporting resulted 
in readers believing there was a crime wave, when statistically there was no more crime than 
usual. The reporters reported facts about crimes that actually happened; it was the framing in the 
context of increased crime reporting that led people to believe there was a crime wave.248  
 While the press undoubtedly influences national (and local) discussions, sometimes 
seemingly creating issues, it would be unfair and inaccurate to ignore their role as watchdog, 
even in policing their own. Barry Glassner’s249 book The Culture of Fear250 is entirely 
concerned with how news stories use meaningless statistics and framing devices (including 
racism, sexism, and political motives) to blow minor and nonexistent risks out of proportion and 
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make them the focus of national debate. However, amid numerous, specific examples of the
journalistic offenses, he came to the defense of some of the same media outlets, saying, that the 
“institutions most culpable for creating and sustaining scares…are also the most promising 
candidates for positiv
se 
e change.”251  
                                                
Glassner pointed out that of all the people involved in creating and framing issues—
advocacy organizations, corporate spokesmen, political parties, religious groups, et cetera—news 
organizations are the only ones that can be objective, and that don’t have a major stake in the 
outcome of an issue. Glassner said, “reporters not only spread fears; they also debunk them and 
criticize one another for spooking the public.”252 (Among the organizations he alternately 
accuses and praises for this are the New York Times, the Los Angeles Times, the Washington 
Post, and USA Today.) Stakeholder organizations, on the other hand, tend to frame issues in the 
most positive way possible for their organizations.  
Other organizations, some of whom are not necessarily logical stakeholders in an issue, 
may also seize upon an issue and frame it in a way that facilitates dissemination of their message. 
Glassner cited examples of big-government frames used implicitly in the 1990s discussions 
about unwed teenage mothers on welfare or food stamps253 and vaccination254. Debate over 
mandatory vaccination is also frequently framed as “big brother.” 
In this way, framing can also allow a debate on a taboo topic under the guise of debating 
another. Glassner provides several examples, including the subtle and not-so-subtle frames of 
racism used to discuss various topics such as street drugs: articles about the scourge of opium in 
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the 1870s were used as a forum to advocate discrimination against Chinese immigrants255. 
Articles about crack babies256 and unwed teenage mothers257 were used in the 1980s and 1990s 
to express and validate racist views of inner-city blacks. 
 Framing can be done intentionally and unintentionally. Speaking to the former position, 
Meyer said, “The great responsibility of news producers is to tell people what to think about 258 
However, framing is not necessarily intentional. Reporters do not always intend to influence 
debate when they write a story.  Meyer wrote that “What makes things news is a set of opinions 
on the relative salience of different persons and events.”259 “People differently placed in relation 
to an event do indeed see different events” but that similarities may appear because the reporters 
and leadership of different news organizations “are dealing with the same realities.”260 Strentz 
agreed with the latter position, saying “the power of the press” is a misleading concept “because 
power often connotes a degree of formal and organized control to effect change, whereas 
influence may be subtle, indirect, or unintended.”261  
TS Meyer said that if news is defined as “human statements about the world,” many 
reporters address this by “simply gathering a number of statements from different humans.”262 
Each of these humans brings a different perception of the world and its events, resulting in an 
unquantifiable number of different possible frames. “Each reporter has his or her own 
background, education, opinion, and ‘apperceptive mass,’ as it used to be called. And each editor 
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or producer responsible for the final shape of the story, in print or broadcast, has his or her own 
view of what the readership or the audience wants to know or should know about this event.”263 
 Frames are actually quite helpful in conveying meaning in a short space and a brief 
amount of time, qualities which are essential in the newspaper business. Bob Franklin, a 
journalism professor at the University of Cardiff, wrote about the necessity of framing in news 
stories. “When people have little direct knowledge of events, they become increasingly reliant on 
news media for information, but also an understanding or interpretation, of those events.”264 
Machin and Niblock wrote, “A story that already fits into an existing frame of reference will 
seem naturally newsworthy. This will mean that the story will need less contextualization and 
therefore less likely to lose the attention of the audience or readers.”265 
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Introduction to Case Studies 
  The 2001 Anthrax attacks were a turning point in the CDC’s role as a health 
communication agency. The CDC’s communications and infectious disease staffs had not 
previously been called upon to respond to anything like it before. Frames of terrorism, evil, and 
killer diseases coming back from the forgotten past, presented against a backdrop of danger and 
secrecy, and illustrated with repeated images of the World Trade Center towers burning and 
collapsing all contributed to a highly emotional, nationwide atmosphere of panic and fear.  
Government officials, including CDC communication staff, were criticized for their 
response. Administration officials tightened control over information, so the communication 
response was muddled, inadequate, and badly mishandled. Worst of all, it multiplied the frame of 
fear through which the public was interpreting these events. Even the silence helped frame the 
issue as unspeakable.  
Fortunately, a lot of good came from the CDC’s experience. They analyzed and criticized 
their own communication response to the attacks in numerous meetings and articles, and many 
outside researchers offered criticism as well. Through this event, the CDC’s communication 
personnel learned how important risk and crisis communication are to managing a dangerous and 
frightening situation—or any other health risk. 
In the literature, “risk communication” and “crisis communication” are sometimes used 
interchangeably, and sometimes differentiated. For the purposes of this paper, risk 
communication refers to communicating any kind of health risk, especially an ongoing one. 
Examples of health risks include obesity, air pollution, or exposure to seasonal cold or flu. Risk 
communication may involve explaining to an audience what their risks are, what they can do to 
mitigate them, and why they would want to take precautions. Crisis communication refers to an 
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acute-onset situation (like an outbreak, large-scale accident, or bioterrorism attack) that must be 
managed. People in a crisis may be emotional and fearful; the crisis communicator must 
demonstrate empathy, control, honesty, timeliness, and transparency.  
The cases used in this study all exhibit the characteristics of health risk and crisis. They 
evoke fear and emotional responses, and communicators must manage the situation by keeping 
the public informed and by demonstrating control. The deadly outbreak of listeriosis food 
poisoning in 2002 was a classic public health crisis situation: illness from an unknown food 
source was sickening and killing people. Not only was the bacterium was known to cause 
pregnant women to miscarry, but its manifestation showed, less than a year after 9/11, how easy 
it would be to contaminate the nation’s food supply. The discovery that same summer that the 
relatively new, deadly West Nile virus could be transmitted by organ transplant and blood 
transfusion raised the specter of vulnerability in the nation’s transplant supply.  
It is clear that risk and crisis communications would be the appropriate method of 
handling these two situations. Both had unknowns, and the ability to generate fear and panic, and 
both which needed to be managed. Both also had risk that needed to be addressed; audiences had 
to be informed of what the risks were and how they could protect themselves. 
The case of autism is less obvious. The causes and risk factors for autism aren’t known, 
so it is not possible to communicate risk mitigation strategies. However, the situation with autism 
resembles a health crisis in several ways. There are some very important unknowns about autism, 
namely, how to treat or cure it, and how it is caused. The wide range and variety of symptoms 
are also a source of ambiguity about the disease. As if the disorder weren’t a scary enough 
proposition, it affects children—in fact, they are the entire focus of the debate—which adds to 
the parental and societal fear. This fear is constant and ongoing, but parents are fearful, panicked, 
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and emotional as they seek information about the disorder and seek to protect their children. 
Autism was referred to by advocates as a crisis or epidemic, and parents wanted to be kept 
informed as much as anybody in an outbreak or other crisis situation. 
Frames of fear and emotion are the common denominator in all of these cases. Just as 
framing can invoke those emotions, it can also be used to reassure and empower the public. 
These cases illustrate what can happen when framing is used to advantage by different interests.  
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Framing the 2002 Listeria Outbreak 
In the year after the September 11 terrorists attacks and anthrax attacks, public officials 
and the public alike worried about the vulnerability of the nation’s food and water supplies. 
Preparedness work done in the wake of the attacks revealed how easy it would be for a terrorist 
to release a poison or biological agent into the population. This fear framed numerous health 
events and outbreaks. 
An outbreak of food poisoning caused by Listeria monocytogenes266 bacteria (listeriosis) 
in late summer of 2002 prompted the largest recall of meat in U.S. history. Two poultry 
processing plants owned by Pilgrim’s Pride ended up recalling 24.7 million pounds of processed 
turkey and chicken by the time the outbreak was over.  The outbreak also shone a light on 
inadequate food inspection process and accusations of corruption in U.S. Department of 
Agriculture leadership. 
The earliest press mention of this outbreak267 came when the “Nation in Brief” sections 
of the September 15 Washington Post and Los Angeles Times warned of an “unexpected 
increase” in listeriosis cases in Pennsylvania.268 An article in the September 17 New York Times 
said that six people in the New York City area had died of listeriosis that summer, but that the 
source was still unknown. The writer interviewed a spokesman for the Pennsylvania Department 
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of Health; he described the Listeria bacteria’s unusual propensity for thriving in cold 
temperatures and on previously cooked meat.269 
On September 18 the CDC responded with a press release.270 As the outbreak progressed 
and more information became available, the agency continued issuing a steady stream of press 
release updates on the outbreak. The agency disseminated 14 releases in less than two months. 
However, by the time the outbreak had been identified (September 18), 26 people had already 
become ill, and four had died.271 
Most of the CDC’s press releases, including the first one, were scientific in tone and did 
not appear to be particularly aimed at the public. The releases mentioned “acquired illness from 
the same food” without a more public-friendly reference to “food poisoning.” The first release 
wrote, in epidemiologic terms, of the “‘background’ of sporadic Listeria infections that are 
expected to occur.”272 The first three releases announced, in the second sentence of each release, 
that “the Listeria bacteria has been isolated and pulsed-field gel electrophoresis (PFGE)-
matched” to the sick patients.273 The releases warned pregnant women, newborns, the elderly, 
and others with weakened immune systems to be especially careful; food-safety tips followed the 
warnings. As the toll of the outbreak climbed, the CDC releases continued to faithfully report the 
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statistics and the specifics, including warnings more carefully targeted at vulnerable populations, 
including pregnant women who could miscarry due to even a minor Listeria infection.  
Despite the rising number of illnesses and deaths, the newspapers did not report on the 
outbreak right away. In fact, it wasn’t until October 4, seven CDC press releases and nearly two 
weeks later, that the press started to pick up on the story. This is notable considering the potential 
for media priming: the number of high-profile food poisoning cases and large-scale food recalls 
that had already happened in 2002, and the bioterrorism fears that lingered barely a year after the 
9/11 attacks. The illness and death tolls were rising, but the CDC announced that the leading 
suspect was not bioterrorism, but deli turkey.274 
In contrast to the scientific, factual frame of the CDC press releases, many newspaper 
reports focused on corruption, bureaucracy, and ineptitude of the United States Department of 
Agriculture (USDA), the department largely responsible for the safety of the nation’s meat 
supply. Most reports expressed outrage at the incompetence and/or collusion of USDA 
leadership and the lack of standards governing the U. S. food supply. Some reports praised a 
USDA inspector who risked disapproval from his supervisors to bring the problems at the 
Pilgrims Pride plants to light. One New York Times story on October 5 reported that the CDC had 
linked 40 illnesses and 7 deaths to the same strain of the bacteria, and that they suspected sliced 
deli turkey. “The Agriculture Department, however, has not been able to confirm this.”275 
On October 9, a CDC release confirmed that the USDA announced a voluntary recall of 
turkey meat;276 a Washington Post article the next day confirmed that 295,000 pounds of turkey 
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and chicken products were being recalled. However, the article noted, the products were 
produced on August 14, and that the “use by” dates on the products in question had already 
started to pass.277 That same day, the New York Times reported that the USDA “said that tests 
show no link between this recall and the Listeria outbreak that has killed seven people.”278 
However, the Times pointed out that “inspectors were searching for the source of that strain 
when they discovered contaminated turkey pastrami that was produced at the corporations’ 
Wampler Foods plant in Franconia, PA, on August 14.”279 Furthermore, on October 13, 
inspectors found samples of the deadly Listeria strain at the Pilgrim’s Pride Franconia plant. 
They closed the plant, and announced an additional recall of over 27 million pounds of turkey. 
The onus was placed on consumers to “check their refrigerators and freezers” for the recalled 
meat, and return it to the place where they had bought it.280 The amount of the additional recall 
included all turkey produced since May, and Pilgrim’s Pride officials estimated that roughly two-
thirds of that had “probably been eaten or thrown out by now.”281 
Newspapers continued to call for reform of the nation’s meat safety regulations. They 
interviewed consumer and environmental groups, including members of the Sierra Club, and the 
Consumer Federation of America.282  
Wampler and Pilgrim’s Pride officials continued to maintain that none of their products 
were linked to the outbreak.283 Elizabeth Becker of the New York Times reported that Pilgrim’s 
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Pride chief financial officer Roger Cogdill “disagreed with the (consumer) advocates, who, he 
said, failed to appreciate the voluntary nature of his company’s recall.”284 (This is notable 
because all recalls were technically voluntary, as the USDA did not have the authority to recall 
any food for any reason.) Cogdill also attempted to spin the cramped, dirty conditions at their 
feedlot as one that allowed them to better “control bacteria in the animals.”285 It is fairly clear, 
from the messages to the choice of spokesperson, that Pilgrim’s Pride was too busy trying to dig 
themselves out of a hole to worry about effective framing. Choosing as a spokesman someone 
whose main responsibility is to protect the company’s stock price when people are dying goes 
against public relations and risk communications best practices that recommend choosing a 
spokesperson who can be honest and empathetic with the effected population, and who 
demonstrates a genuine interest in entering a dialogue with them. 
The listeriosis outbreak came right on the heels of another rash of food poisonings from 
tainted meat, one of several outbreaks that contributed greatly to the press framing of the 
listeriosis outbreak. In July 2002, an E. coli outbreak sickened 26 people and prompted ConAgra 
to recall 19 million pounds of beef. This episode inspired an editorial in the Atlanta Journal-
Constitution calling for the federal government to streamline and toughen current food inspection 
practices. The article said the current “laissez-faire regulatory scheme” is “ripe for all manner of 
abuse,” and currently involves 10 different, understaffed agencies and no “enforceable industry 
performance standards.” The article further invoked the frames of government ineptitude and 
industry corruption by pointing out that USDA leadership ignored warnings from its own 
personnel as early as February 2002 regarding E. coli in the same Colorado ConAgra plant 
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responsible for the E. coli outbreak.286 Additionally, the Los Angeles Times had published stories 
that August about Listeria contamination in cheesecakes supplied by the Cheesecake Factory to 
19 Olive Garden restaurants,287 and another recall that month of 10,000 packages of queso fresco 
due to potential Listeria contamination.288    
The story continued to unfold, with more evidence of corruption being uncovered. Becker 
wrote that a May 2002 memo to new USDA meat inspectors had been made public. She said that 
in the memo, “inspectors were told that they could be held accountable for lost production” if 
they had a plant shut down or slowed production for an inspection, and later “failed to justify” 
doing so.289 USDA and industry spokespeople continued to deny any wrongdoing, but this only 
seemed to help consumer advocates and the press in their attempts to show the USDA and the 
meatpacking industry as corrupt and unreasonable. Becker said the May 2002 memo went so far 
as to define the “limits of what is considered feces.”290 She then quoted Carol Tucker Foreman 
of the Consumer Federation of America, who said, “Poop is poop. I can’t think of any 
circumstance where it is tolerable to have fecal material on any meat coming off the line.”291 
This effectively framed the issue of increased government oversight as a simple choice: do you 
want to eat fecal matter in your food or not? 
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On October 15, ten days after the CDC’s press releases first said it suspected the 
Pilgrim’s Pride plant, the USDA announced that the plant was likely the source of the 
outbreak.292 However, the New York Times reported the USDA’s Stephen Cohen as saying that 
despite the announcement, USDA investigators hadn’t actually found any of that same strain of 
bacteria in the meat products. However, the CDC’s press releases continued to name Pilgrim’s 
Pride as the culprit. CDC spokesman Tom Skinner was reported in an October 16 USA Today 
article as saying that the turkey from the Pilgrim’s Pride plant in Franconia, PA, was the likely 
source, and that (according to the author) “it was highly unlikely that matching samples of the 
microbe taken from the plant and patients were not linked.”293 
There were more accusations of corruption. An October 16 editorial in the New York 
Times focused on corruption in the USDA, saying that despite multiple outbreaks and several 
deaths, “the department appears in no hurry to activate safety standards that could reduce the risk 
of future outbreaks.”294 The author accused the USDA of being “under industry influence” and 
declining to adequately regulate, test, and label meat before it enters the marketplace.295   
With over 27 million pounds of deli meat being recalled from the general food supply, 
and most of it eaten before the recall was issued, it would be expected that some of the deli meat 
would have been consumed by children. Some articles touched upon this fear and engaged in 
some episodic framing, including one article featuring interviews with parents whose children 
had died in various food poisoning episodes.296 The New York Times reported that these families 
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went to Washington, D.C. to lobby for better oversight of the food processing industry, including 
giving the USDA the authority to issue recalls.297 One of the advocacy groups managed to frame 
the food safety issue in terms of the war on terror, saying, “Our children and our families deserve 
not to encounter terror at the dinner table,” and urged President Bush to “declare a war on 
foodborne illness.”298 The article was illustrated by a photo of a little girl with her mother, 
looking at a scrapbook of photos of her late brother, who died from food poisoning. However, in 
this same article, Rosemary Mucklow from the National Meat Association was quoted 
attempting to place the responsibility on the individual, saying that the industry didn’t need more 
regulation; consumers needed to be educated. “The biggest issue is to get the consumer to cook 
the meat thoroughly.”299 (Remember that the meat involved in this recall was pre-cooked, ready-
to-eat deli meat.) 
On October 18, the New York Times reported that Secretary of Agriculture Ann Veneman 
had announced increased plant testing. This was said to be the first response to the outbreak by 
anyone in the Bush administration.300  By October 29, top government officials were reported in 
USA Today as saying the meat industry’s inspection system was “broken” and that they intended 
to address the issue. J. Patrick Boyle of the American Meat Institute was reported in the same 
article as saying that if that was the case, it was also the fault of government, “a joint failing.”301 
The outbreak may have been over by November 4, but the story was still evolving. The 
Los Angeles Times reported that the Philadelphia Inquirer had discovered that inspectors had 
warned their superiors of “numerous sanitation violations,” including mold and cockroaches, 
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present at the Pilgrim’s Pride plant months before it was implicated in the outbreak.302 By 
December 12, the New York Times and Washington Post had named this whistleblower as 
Vincent Erthal, a USDA inspector who claimed his efforts to “force a cleanup…eight months 
before the outbreak” had been thwarted by the chief government inspector there.303 The 
Washington Post reported Erthal as saying he had filed two year’s worth of reports citing the 
unsanitary conditions; it also reported top USDA officials and officials in the meat industry as 
trying to cast doubt on his claims.304 They were probably unknowingly—framing him as a hero 
to the victims of the big-government, big-industry corruption they were also unknowingly 
creating. In a December 15 article that eventually became part of her Beating Back the Devil 
book, M.A.J. McKenna also framed the public health officials who investigated the Listeria 
outbreak (and were largely ignored by both the CDC’s press releases and the press during the 
outbreak) as heroes, risking their own safety to keep the public healthy.305 
In this incident, most newspapers in this study sought out numerous dissenting voices, 
but only after speaking only with the official spokespeople at the USDA and Pilgrim’s Pride. 
Once the “official” sources seemed to be hiding something, the press dug deeper to find out what 
the real story was. Despite the alluring framing devices of government scandal, industry 
corruption, sickness, death, and lumbering bureaucracies, the press did not succumb to the 
temptation to sensationalize. The CDC largely stayed out of the fray by presenting scientific 
facts with no apparent agenda attached, other than helping people stay healthy during a crisis. 
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Hallahan, Iyengar, Wallack et al., and others wrote about the news media’s tendency to 
use episodic framing and how that lends itself to framing issues as the responsibility or fault of 
corrupt individuals rather than a corrupt system. The coverage of this outbreak certainly pointed 
fingers at the top USDA officials who Vincent Erthal said had been warned of the contamination 
before the outbreak occurred. However, while the articles didn’t find fault with society as a 
whole, they did implicate the entire convoluted process of food plant inspections, which had 
proven quite inadequate to protect the U.S. food supply. Some also found fault with the Bush 
administration306 for blocking legislation, written during the waning days of the Clinton 
administration, that proponents said would have made the inspection process more effective.307 
Another story presented an unusual (at least in this outbreak) twist on the thematic frame, saying 
people were much more likely to die on the nation’s highways, from an accidental fall than from 
eating contaminated meat; the author, John Balzar, attempted to demonstrate these fears as 
overblown by comparing the odds to those of being killed in a gang murder or drowning in the 
bathtub.308 
Wallach et al. said that health issues are usually framed as individual responsibility, to the 
exclusion of implicating systemic problems.309 This is the case from standpoint of the public 
health officials quoted in the articles. The meat industry and Pilgrim’s Pride spokespeople, on the 
other hand, certainly positioned the issue as each person’s responsibility to protect themselves. 
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By the time the outbreak was over, 53 people had taken ill, eight had died, and three 
pregnant women had miscarried.  The CDC’s press releases, despite taking a non-public-friendly 
scientific tone, were intended to aid in the treatment and prevention of illness. In fact, 13 of the 
CDC’s 14 releases on the outbreak described the symptoms of listeriosis and precautions to 
avoid becoming ill. Despite not containing a single quote from a CDC official, the releases were 
factual and frequent, and framed the CDC as being both above the fray and in control of the 
situation, as well as showing much more concern for people’s health than the spokespeople from 
the USDA and the meat processing companies. 
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Framing West Nile Virus Transmission Through Organ Transplant, 2002 
West Nile virus is now established as a seasonally-recurring disease in North America, 
but in 2002 it was still new and had the power to frighten people. Experts believe the 
mosquitoborne virus arrived in the United States from Africa or the Middle East in 1999310, and 
it manifested over the next few summers as a painful illness that felled countless crows, some 
horses, and humans, starting with an outbreak in New York City. 
In early August 2002, a Georgia woman’s organs were harvested for transplant after she 
succumbed to injuries received in a car accident a month earlier. Four people received her 
organs. Later, all four recipients tested positive for West Nile virus infection. The organ donor 
had been in a coma for a month, and had received numerous blood transfusions before she died. 
Officials came to suspect that she contracted West Nile from the transfusions.  
The possibility of contracting a deadly disease through what was intended to be a 
lifesaving procedure is just the kind of story that sells newspapers. West Nile virus, or WNV, 
had only been discovered in the United States three years prior. Originally from Africa, West 
Nile Virus can cause encephalitis, nerve pain, fever, and death. It was known to be transmitted 
by mosquitoes; horses and birds were known animal reservoirs. In short, it’s a subject that invites 
sensationalist journalism. On the other hand, serious threats require thoughtful research, if 
humanity is to benefit from the work.  
The 2002 West Nile season was shaping up to be particularly bad. By August 20, there 
had already been 251 cases of West Nile virus in the United States in 2002, with a projection of 
up to 1000 cases for the year.311 New York Times reporter Denise Grady asked, Why here? Why 
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now? Until 1999, the disease had never even been detected in North America.” She answered 
this question by placing West Nile Virus in the context of an increasing number of new diseases 
that had appeared since the mid-1970’s, “a time when it was widely assumed that most infectious 
diseases had been conquered or at least controlled.” Grady cited a 2000 report by the World 
Health Organization that blamed the rise of disease emergence on ecological factors (including 
global warming), human factors including war and population growth, international travel and 
commerce, microbial factors including antibiotic resistance, breakdowns in public health 
measures including vaccination and insect control, and “technological and industrial factors like 
food processing, livestock handling, and organ transplants.”312  
On August 30, the CDC announced that there had been 638 cases of West Nile virus with 
31 fatalities in 2002 so far. 313 On this same date, the Washington Post pointed out that the 
number of new cases for the week of August 21–28 represented a 62% increase over the previous 
week, but also said that “the number (of new cases) was expected to peak by mid-
September.”314 315  
Also by this date, the CDC had already disseminated five press releases on this year’s 
West Nile season. They all featured an update on the number of cases and fatalities by state, but 
two of them featured quotes by then-HHS secretary Tommy Thompson and CDC director Dr. 
Julie Gerberding. The August 28 release announced HHS funding to help states fight the disease; 
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Dr. Gerberding warned, “West Nile virus is rapidly emerging this summer in previously 
unaffected areas.”316  
West Nile virus, though it had been a common news topic over the past three years, still 
had the power to frighten, and as such, it was sometimes framed in the context of other historical 
plagues. One Maryland man wrote, in a letter to the health section editor of the Washington Post, 
that the dead birds and rodents he presumed had fallen prey to the virus, “reminds me of the 
bubonic plague of the Middle Ages.”317 In an August 30 editorial in the Washington Post, a D.C. 
artist focused on the disappearance of the once-ubiquitous crows from her neighborhood. She 
pondered the crows’ suffering from West Nile virus and how the spread of the disease could 
mean disaster for some bird species. She also framed the disease in the context of the “countless 
holocausts, natural and human-engineered” that the world has seen, and said that “(w)hile (West 
Nile’s) effect on the human population has, thankfully, not been nearly as widespread as on other 
species, we are just beginning to appreciate its virulence.”318 Not only did she use the frame of 
past tragedies to evoke emotion, but she also invoked a frame of globalism, the idea that the 
planet’s creatures, or at least its people, share a common fate, to some degree.  
The earliest press report319 that someone may have contracted West Nile Virus from an 
organ transplant came from the New York Times, in an August 31 article titled, “Transplant May 
Have Led to West Nile in Man, 71.”320 The man had died from the illness. The article quoted 
both Dr. Gerberding and Florida’s secretary of health, Dr. John O. Agwunobi, both of whom 
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appeared to be concerned, yet calm and in control. Article author Lawrence K. Altman further 
added to the sense of control by mentioning that West Nile is most likely to cause serious illness 
in those with weakened immune systems, including organ transplant patients,321 allowing people 
who considered themselves in good health the opportunity to not worry about it. It wasn’t until 
later in the article that he raised the possibility that the ability for West Nile to be transmitted this 
way may pose a threat to the nation’s blood supply. “We have a lot of work to do, but we are 
doing it fast,” the article quotes Dr. Gerberding as saying.322 
 The next day a CDC press release came out saying that the agency, along with the Food 
and Drug Administration (FDA)323, the Georgia State Department of Health, and the Florida 
Department of Health were investigating all four patients who received transplanted organs from 
the Georgia woman, based on “preliminary evidence…that these illnesses might be due to West 
Nile virus infection.” The release also stated that although such transmission “has been a 
theoretical possibility,” it had not actually been observed.324 The New York Times reported that 
one of these patients, also from Florida, had West Nile fever (as opposed to encephalitis), a 
milder form of the illness.325 The Times article appeared on page 18 of the paper, but the story 
made the front page of the Atlanta Journal-Constitution. M.A.J. McKenna seized on the novelty 
of the situation, writing that “if all four infections are confirmed and linked to the transplants…it 
would represent the first time that West Nile virus is known to have been transmitted from 
person to person in any manner.”326 Having grabbed readers’ attention with that, she said later in 
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the article that health officials wanted to make quite clear that transmission through blood or 
organs had not been confirmed. She quoted Dr. James Hughes, director of the CDC’s National 
Center for Infectious Diseases, saying, “we feel it is a high priority to rapidly and aggressively 
investigate” the possible cases person-to-person transmission.327 McKenna also mentioned in her 
article that the investigation would likely be complex, and that they would first have to rule out 
coincidental infection by a mosquito bite, something not altogether impossible since all patients 
resided in areas where West Nile was already present. She also reiterated that the patients were 
all on immunosuppressant drugs following their transplants, which made them more susceptible 
to a serious form of West Nile.328  
 West Nile is an imported disease, and this is occasionally mentioned using a frame of 
foreignness. This associates the disease with other “loathsome” foreign things: immigrant hordes 
carrying disease, Africanized “killer” bees, AIDS, and other “foreign” invaders. McKenna 
mentions in an article another case of foreign disease, Chagas disease, contracted by patients at 
Emory University School of Medicine after receiving organs from an immigrant.329 The New 
York Times likened the potential threat to the blood supply to the threat caused by English blood 
donors who might carry bovine spongiform encephalitis, or “mad cow” disease.330 
Throughout the course of this investigation, press articles featured plenty of quotes by 
different officials, indicating that spokespeople must have been readily available to answer 
questions. These spokespeople, mostly from the CDC, but some from the Georgia and Florida 
state health departments and the FDA, were fairly consistent about staying “on message,” saying 
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that the risk for contracting West Nile via a transplant or transfusion was very low, and that the 
best way to protect oneself from West Nile virus is to wear insect repellant and long pants and 
sleeves when in mosquito-infested areas. For the most part, the reporters seemed to appreciate 
the forthcoming nature of the health officials, and most stories seemed to agree with them that 
the risk of transmission via the manner in question was low.  
However, some stories mentioned the scary unknowns, like the fact that “it was not 
known how many” other people had been transfused with blood from the supply that may have 
infected the index patient.331 A USA Today article titled “Officials Fear Human Spread of West 
Nile…” said “officials are working…to determine the threat that the West Nile virus poses to 
recipients of blood transfusions and donated organs.”332 This language suggests that there is, in 
fact, a threat, a fear, despite health officials’ messages that the risk is actually very low. 
Likewise, McKenna reported the following: “Asked if the government could assure the 
public that the blood supply is absolutely safe, (Dr. Jesse) Goodman (of the FDA) said no.”333 
Considering McKenna’s usual respect for the open access and good relationship she had with the 
CDC’s researchers, leadership, and media relations staff, why did she report that they couldn’t 
“absolutely” guarantee something that’s impossible to guarantee at any time? Perhaps she was 
trying a fear appeal to spice up her story. Perhaps it was because this was an FDA spokesman 
and not someone from the CDC. Whatever the reason, intentional or not, it framed the issue as a 
reason for fear, and as an aberration, a flaw in the system—more episodic than thematic—and it 
is probably the sort of angle that gets more eyes on the page. 
                                                 
331 Alan Cooperman, “Transmission of West Nile In Ga. Transplants Probed.” The Washington Post, 2 
September 2002, sec. A, p. 2. 
332 Davis, Robert, and Manning, Anita. “Officials fear human spread of West Nile ; Organ recipients have 
virus-like symptoms.” USA Today, 3 September 2002, sec. D, p. 8. 
333 M. A. J. McKenna, “West Nile focus now on Atlanta blood bank.” Atlanta Journal-Constitution, 2 
September 2002, sec. A, p.1. 
94 
The case of West Nile being transmitted through organ transplant and blood transfusion 
could have caused quite a panic if officials hadn’t made themselves available to answer 
questions, address concerns, and keep a uniform message of safety and reassurance to the public. 
CDC Media Relations staff reassured and informed public but also used the press releases as an 
opportunity to reinforce the message of prevention in what was already proving to be an 
especially bad West Nile virus season. The good reception journalists gave forthcoming public 
health officials seems to confirm framing theorists’ notions that the press generally supports the 
notion of a sound society with problems caused by occasional flaws, corruption, or aberrations. 
This was also apparent in the previous case study on listeriosis. Autism, however, may illustrate 
what happens in a more drawn-out situation. 
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The Autism Debate, 2002–2007 
The causes of autism were hotly debated throughout the study period in most major U.S. 
newspapers. However, despite the 2277 autism articles that appeared in the five major U.S. 
newspapers analyzed in the six-year study period334, the CDC distributed only 7 press releases. 
As the public clamored for information, this relative silence allowed—or forced—the 
newspapers, influenced by the sources they interviewed, to frame the issue themselves. 
 Numerous issues are at the heart of this controversy, and the confusion surrounding the 
debate contributes to its perpetuation. Many parents, especially those of autistic children, believe 
they know what causes autism and autism spectrum disorders (ASDs). To them, the things they 
see—a child regressing into autism after receiving a vaccine, a child having fewer behavioral and 
physical symptoms after a diet change or removal of an allergen335, geeky parents336—may 
appear to be irrefutable evidence. However, ASDs cover a wide array of physical and mental 
symptoms, which in turn vary greatly in their severity, and scientists have yet to find the cause or 
the cure. Further complicating the issue is the fact that some autism appears to be present in 
some children from early infancy, while others appear to develop normally and then regress in 
toddlerhood or early childhood. Also, many researchers contend that it is the autism diagnoses—
not the cases—that are actually on the rise. Reasons for this are given as growing awareness of 
the disorder, an expansion of the definition to encompass an entire “spectrum” of symptoms, and 
the fact that an autism diagnosis is often the only way for families to get special education and 
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services for children with a wide array of symptoms and behavioral problems.337 It is a 
frustrating condition for all involved, from the people who have it, to the people who care for 
them, to the researchers who devote their lives to finding a cause or a cure. 
The main focus of the vaccine-autism debate has been the mercury compound thimerosal. 
Thimerosal338 was developed in 1928 and has been used for decades as a vaccine preservative. 
Thimerosal is an ethylmercury compound; however, most lay allegations of risk and effects on 
neurological development are based on studies of methylmercury. Methylmercury, the 
environmental mercury toxin released by burning coal, is known to cause problems with 
neurological development in children, and takes much longer to leave the body than 
ethylmercury.339 And while some maintain that the symptoms of mercury poisoning and autism 
are the same, many researchers maintain that the symptoms appear similar only superficially and 
are actually quite different.340  
Most of the debate focuses on the MMR (measles-mumps-rubella) vaccine. The 1998 
Lancet article that actually sparked the debate documented a study of 12 children who were 
referred to the study after they had exhibited developmental disorders, and the suspicion of a link 
to MMR initially came from the parents of eight of the children, not the researchers or 
doctors.341 The article focused on the children’s gastrointestinal symptoms and suggested faulty 
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digestive processes may be a cause of autism, and that symptoms improved after removal o
certain allergens. It also mentioned that the behavioral changes the children underwent were 
dissimilar. They concluded that more research was needed to “examine this syndrome and it
possible causal relation to this vaccine.”
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Compulsory vaccination of children before registering for school is a law in every U.S. 
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vaccinated. According to the Institute for Vaccine Safety, run by the Johns Hopkins Bloomberg 
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and any other unspecified non-medical exemption.”347 Many parents cite fears of vaccine-related 
injury in their choices not to vaccinate.  
While vaccination is technically mandatory, people on both sides of the issue sometimes 
frame it as a choice, in which they need to assess the risks and make their own decisions. Those 
who don’t want their children vaccinated may use this frame perhaps because it empowers them, 
or they feel the risk of compliance is dangerous; the CDC may use this frame subtly when it 
recommends that people discuss concerns with their health care professional. This serves several 
purposes: it empowers people to make their own decisions (or at least feel like they did), 
possibly decreases resistance to the policy by making the agency look less totalitarian348, and 
finally, the CDC probably knew that most doctors would probably convince their patients of the 
benefits of vaccination.  
Since controversy over thimerosal in vaccines began in 1998, thimerosal has been 
removed from all routine childhood vaccines in the United States, with the exception of some 
seasonal flu vaccines.349 Though researchers had been unable to find a causal link, they 
acknowledged that it was biologically possible for such a chemical to cause disruptions in 
neurological development.350 It is doubtful whether they would have removed it, however, had it 
not been for the uproar. Nonetheless, this was the official stand:  
The CDC, American Academy of Pediatrics, Institute of Medicine 
and other prestigious medical organizations maintain there is no 
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known link between vaccines and autism. Studies published in the 
New England Journal of Medicine and elsewhere also have found 
no link. Even after thimerosal was removed from infant vaccines, 
the autism rate has continued to climb.351 
However, that didn’t stop thousands of parents from writing letters to editors, protesting at 
various CDC campuses, taking out ads, building Web sites, and homeschooling their children in 
an effort to “protect” them from government-mandated vaccines. The “big government” frame 
here was obvious. In addition, the surest way in most states to prevent a child from being 
vaccinated was to claim a religious exemption. This fed directly into the faith vs. science frame 
that the CDC already found themselves fighting on so many fronts.  
 The fact that thimerosal was removed from all routine childhood vaccines in 2001352 did 
not stop some people for implicating it. During 2002 and 2003 the debate in the press about 
whether vaccines caused autism was just starting to pick up steam. There were a few articles in 
2002 about families suing for damages, claiming vaccines had caused their children’s autism353, 
and about people suspicious that vaccines caused autism.354 However most journalists seemed 
skeptical of a link. In a thematically-framed USA Today article, Anita Manning wrote about 
parents who believe vaccines cause autism, saying that the “mainstream medical experts” who 
claim vaccines are safe are “backed by reams of scientific studies.”355 She interviewed several 
people on both sides of the debate but referred back to the existence of much scientific evidence 
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refuting the theories, using the interviews to illustrate the harm that can come when unvaccinated 
people spread disease.356 In another article, the Atlanta Journal-Constitution’s David Wahlberg 
weighed the pros and cons of different vaccines; he clearly opposition-framed the diseases as 
being much more dangerous than the vaccines.357 Likewise, Donald J. McNeil wrote in a New 
York Times article that fish, not vaccines, are the largest source of mercury for humans.358 Both 
Manning and McNeil wrote that people aren’t afraid of the vaccine-preventable diseases that 
killed so many just a few generations ago, because they have never seen them,359 so they don’t 
believe they are a threat. 
 In 2003, there were more articles covering the debate, many quoting medical 
professionals (mostly pro-vaccination) and parents of autistic children (some pro-vaccination, 
some against), but few CDC spokespeople. There were a few emotional stories about autistic 
children whose parents claimed the autism was brought on by vaccination, but the latter half of 
one story focused on themes of redemption360; another discussed the possibility of recovering 
from autism.361 Jane Brody of the New York Times wrote in “Vaccines and Autism: Beyond the 
Fear Factor,” that “overwhelming evidence so far suggests that thimerosal poses no significant 
threat to the developing brain.”362 She also provided evidence that mercury poisoning and autism 
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have different symptoms.363 Another article discussed soaring measles cases when vaccination 
rates declined.364 
 In 2002 and 2003, though, several articles chronicle some controversy over an 
amendment to a homeland security bill that would prevent vaccine makers, including thimerosal 
manufacturer Eli Lilly, from being sued by people claiming vaccines caused autism in a family 
member. The issue was eventually settled, with language that still protected the vaccine makers, 
and with support from the American Academy of Pediatrics.365 However, this government 
protection made anti-vaccine campaigners suspicious.  
 The autism debate went on in the press for two years of the 2002-2007 study period 
before the CDC’s Media Relations staff weighed in. The first press release they produced during 
this time didn’t come until February 2005. It was a release promoting the “Learn the Signs. Act 
Early” awareness campaign, designed to educate parents about developmental milestones in 
early childhood, and about how early intervention can greatly ameliorate developmental 
disabilities.366 In this release they mentioned the often cited statistic that as many as “1 in 166 
children have a condition in the autism spectrum.”367  
This “1 in 166” statistic is often interpreted in the press and in the literature of anti-
vaccine or anti-thimerosal advocates as 1 in 166 children having autism, whereas the medical 
community interprets the autism spectrum as covering a vast array of conditions and severities 
rather than being one disorder. This evokes the frightening idea that 1 out of 166 American 
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children are deeply and permanently mentally disabled; thus was the issue framed by the 
omission of the details. Many members of the press likely lacked the training to understand what 
the terms meant. However, it indicates both a further need for training, and the responsibility of 
journalists to question and investigate terms and numbers in health journalism. 
Although many researchers and public health officials lament—and are frustrated by—
the profusion of nonscientific and anecdotal information used to refute their scientific studies, 
practicing pediatrician Rahul K. Parikh wrote that the scientific community would do well to 
learn a lesson from their detractors. Parikh wrote in March 2008 about attending a recent national 
conference of the American Academy of Pediatrics, particularly one lecture in which  
”pediatricians from around the country shared story after story of parents who have refused shots 
on the basis of what they had seen on Oprah (specifically a particular September 2007 
episode)368  and elsewhere in the media.”369 Parikh said that such stories persist “despite ample 
research” that debunked the original 1998 article (also retracted) claiming a vaccine-autism link 
for two main reasons: ineffective communications from the “vaccine defenders” (he names the 
CDC by way of example) and the compelling emotional appeals made by the proponents of a 
vaccine-autism link.370 
Parikh said that many parents interpret the “bureaucratic…and…cautious language” 
typical of many scientific and government communications, including those on the vaccine-
autism issue, as uncertainty and an indication that “the vaccines are not safe at all.”371 As an 
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example, he quoted the official CDC statement372 that Winfrey read to the audience on her 
autism show. It was, as Parikh said, “reasonable, clear, and…sympathetic to parents of autistic 
children,” but audiences picked up on the “measured tone,” which “arouses suspicion and 
uncertainty among readers.”373 He said the tactic of ignoring the assertions of a vaccine-autism 
link in an effort to “stay above the fray” or refuse credence to their claims can also backfire, as 
“such silence…can easily be interpreted as concealing a truth.”374  
By way of finding a better approach, Parikh looked at the work of cognitive psychologist 
Drew Westin375 to see what the other camp was doing successfully. “Antivaccine groups are 
well-organized and passionate,” he said, and they use “popular settings” (like Oprah) as venues 
“to make strong emotional appeals.”376 These emotional appeals have been essential to 
convincing parents of autistic children to join groups in blaming vaccines. He said that “logic 
and evidence,” on which the CDC’s autism communicators have been relying, are not as 
persuasive as powerful emotional appeals, as well as “anecdotes, quips, and resonant campaign 
ads.”377 Thus, Parikh concluded, “we have had a failure to persuade.”378 
Finally, Parikh suggested an aggressive approach to regaining control of the autism 
conversation. He said that health and medical research groups, including the CDC379, needed to 
“be more potent when arguing as to why vaccines are safe, effective, and necessary.”380 He said 
they needed to counter emotional appeals with their own emotional appeals, saying, “if 
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opponents to vaccines put a celebrity on Oprah, then we need to take out a full-page ad in 
national newspapers to show parents what a child with tetanus looks like, or air an ad with a 
parent telling the story of how their child died from…meningitis.”381 Such tactics would be 
acceptable “if done ethically” because they tell “the truth…that vaccines save lives.”382 He also 
said that they needed to “craft effective language” to respond to accusations against vaccines, 
and defend their beliefs and research more strongly because they have the power to make a 
change.383 
The language in the CDC autism press releases is scientifically appropriate, but as Parikh 
stated, also impersonal and bureaucratic. It hardly spoke to an audience that was upset about a 
very personal, emotional issue. It may have worked for West Nile and listeriosis, in which people 
were given precautions for prevention, and either treatment advice (listeriosis) or a reasonable 
assurance of low risk (West Nile), but with the causes unknown and no cure, it didn’t work for 
autism.  
A few health journalists whose articles were generally supportive of the scientific 
position on vaccination provided some fodder for the anti-vaccine camp. USA Today’s Anita 
Manning, for instance, wrote several articles that were very supportive of the scientific evidence 
that vaccines were safe, and repeatedly mentioned the danger to society when people choose not 
to get vaccinated. On the other hand, she also wrote often of the controversy, thereby proving it 
newsworthy, and her articles sought balance by including interviews of people in both camps. 
2006 Autism Ad in USA Today Sparks CDC Response 
  The scientific evidence refutes a link between autism and vaccination: “Since 2001, with 
the exception of some influenza (flu) vaccines, thimerosal is not used as a preservative in 
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routinely recommended childhood vaccines.”384 However, the groups of people who disagree are 
very vocal—and in opposition to the CDC’s stand. 
 In 2006, one of these groups accomplished something 2277 articles hadn’t been able to 
do: generate a direct response from the CDC office of media relations. The founders of 
Generation Rescue,385 under the name Put Children First, ran a full-page ad386 in USA Today, 
alleging that the CDC “created an epidemic of autism in America” by requiring children to 
receive mercury-laden vaccinations, and that the agency was covering up the evidence. The ad 
asked, via a half-page-high headline, “If you caused a 6,000% increase in autism, wouldn’t you 
try to cover it up, too?” The ad also chided the CDC for not investigating the treatment regimen 
Generation Rescue’s Web sites advocated, and said, “As long as the CDC denies that mercury 
from vaccines is responsible for this epidemic proper treatment will never be made widely 
available to the more than one million American children387 who could be treated today.” Other 
Generation Rescue ads (available on their Web site) ads included messages about children who 
“recovered from autism.” 
Unlike all the other autism press releases disseminated by the CDC’s media relations 
staff, this one was empathetic, direct, and firm. The release positively framed the work CDC 
researchers have done, and continue to do, on autism. The authors of the release framed the quest 
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for causes and cures for autism as a personal388 struggle for not only for the families of autistic 
children, but the researchers as well. They admitted they didn’t know all the answers yet and said 
they had “a long way to go” before they had the “sound, scientifically valid information” they 
needed. They in turn applied a loss frame to the possibility of reduced vaccination rates, saying 
that “history has shown that disruptions in vaccine supplies can render the population more 
vulnerable to diseases we know we can prevent.”389  
The release also did two things that were extremely rare for a CDC press release. First, it 
directly criticized Put Children First’ USA Today ad. “We are extremely disappointed,” the 
release said. “The advertisement completely mischaracterizes the efforts of the CDC, the 
American Academy of Pediatrics, the Institute of Medicine, and others to protect the health and 
well-being of the nation’s children.”390 Second, it was written in first person plural, and was the 
only release in the sample written in first person at all. This supported the frame of the agency 
being not faceless, but made up of human beings searching for answers to the same questions as 
the audience. While the ad accused the CDC of wrongdoing, the CDC release reframed the 
accusation as being not only against the CDC, but against several other very-well respected 
health science and medical organizations—so instead of the accusation being against one 
allegedly corrupt organization, the press release author reframed the issue as being against the 
consensus of the entire scientific community.  
In closing, the release said, “we have to also be careful not to base our health 
recommendations on unproven hypotheses or fear.”391 What the authors had crafted was a press 
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release that encouraged empathy for the researchers and refuted the accusations of the 
advertisement—all without giving Put Children First the “newsworthy” recognition they sought. 
The CDC release never mentioned the organization’s name. 
Issues often become issues because of the attention it receives in the press. By that logic, 
it made sense for the CDC not to distribute numerous press releases denying the claims of those 
insisting on a causal link between vaccines and autism. The journalists on the side of the pro-
vaccine-autism-link camp—whether they took that side out of a desire for balance, oppositional 
journalism, sincere belief, or a simple need to sell papers—helped them frame the debate as that 
of a secretive, uncaring government research agency victimizing innocent children. Their use of 
observational and anecdotal evidence worked because it utilized episodic framing conducive to 
accepting the emotional appeals of this evidence. On (journal) paper, that approach may make 
sense, but it’s not working on newsprint. 
Clearly the scientific community needs to take charge of the way this conversation is 
framed if they want to regain control and authority over this discussion. They need to shift the 
debate from the anecdotal frame back to that of the bigger societal picture. They may need to use 
some emotional appeals straight out of the vaccine-autism-link camp’s playbook, but only long 
enough to widen the frame. 
Postscript to the Autism Debate, 2002-2007 
The debate over whether vaccines cause autism seems far from over. After years of 
studies by prestigious medical research organizations continuously refuted any link between the 
two, a decision by the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services’ National Vaccine Injury 
Compensation program awarded compensation to a family whose daughter, they determined, had 
suffered neurological damage when a routine series of immunizations aggravated an existing 
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condition: a rare mitochondrial disorder. This was a drastic departure from the official stance, 
and it grabbed headlines. 
Although this happened outside of the time frame of this study, it is especially 
noteworthy because it was in direct response to an article—not an ad this time—that appeared in 
the Atlanta Journal-Constitution a week earlier. David Kirby, author of an anti-vaccine book392, 
and billed as an “investigative journalist,” wrote an opinion piece393, harshly criticizing the CDC 
for not making an investigation of the vaccine-autism link a “top priority.”394 He criticized health 
officials for “commanding parents to settle down and adhere to the nation’s rigid immunization 
regime,” suggested that CDC Director Dr. Julie Gerberding was “lying” to the public by saying 
the girl’s genetic disorder and immune reaction to vaccination was an “isolated, unusual case,” 
and called the issue “a national emergency.”395 In his article, Kirby invoked frames of fear, loss, 
and government corruption and deception. 
After 6 years of relative silence on the autism front, despite the vaccine-autism debate 
raging in the nation’s press, the CDC’s press organization spoke up on March 28, 2008. Dr. 
Anne Schuchat, the director of the CDC’s National Center for Immunization and Respiratory 
Diseases and the U. S. Assistant Surgeon General, wrote an article titled “CDC Responds to 
Questions About Vaccines.”396 This article was posted in the “In The News” section of CDC’s 
media relations Web site, the same section as the press releases. 
                                                 
392 David Kirby, Evidence of Harm: Mercury in Vaccines and the Autism Epidemic: A Medical Controversy. 
St. Martin’s Griffin: 2006. This book is cited on the Generation Rescue Web site. 
393 David Kirby. Editorial: “Give us answers on vaccines.” Atlanta Journal-Constitution, 20 March  
2008. Internet, http://www.ajc.com/search/content/opinion/stories/2008/03/20/autismed0320.html. [Accessed 
19 April 2008]. 
394 Ibid. 
395 Ibid. 
396 Dr. Anne Schuchat. “CDC Responds to Questions About Vaccines,” 28 March 2008. Available  
from CDC Web site at http://www.cdc.gov/news/2008/03/VaccineQuestions.html. [Accessed 6 April 2008]. 
109 
In the article, Schuchat effectively turned the tables on Kirby. She applied a gain frame in 
her response, invoking the benefits of vaccines in saving children’s lives, in contrast to his loss-
framed portrayal of sick people allowing themselves to be taken advantage of. Where he had 
framed the CDC as a totalitarian “Big Brother” claiming to know what’s best for the nation’s 
children, Schuchat placed Kirby in that same frame, by saying “the best source of guidance is the 
child’s health care provider.” Where Kirby used the words “rigid” and “adamant” to describe 
CDC officials and their policy on childhood vaccinations, Schuchat further refuted the 
totalitarian frame, saying “there are instances when a child should not receive a recommended 
vaccine,” and again recommending consulting with the family’s doctor.397  
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Conclusions 
The CDC during the period under study was the country’s—and possibly the world’s—
leading agency for health communication. When faced with the need to communicate health 
information to the public, people at the CDC realized they could address their communication 
needs with the same scientific rigor and research efforts that they applied to diseases and health 
conditions. As a result, their communications staff continues to hone their ability to effectively 
reach the public. 
The CDC’s leaders and press officers stepped up quickly and showed they were in 
control during the listeriosis outbreak and West Nile Virus cases. They issued frequent press 
releases containing updates so the public was never left wondering what was going on. More 
importantly for the purposes of this study, the press was never left to doubt whether CDC’s 
communication staff would provide them with information. The CDC’s quick response allowed 
them to frame these issues as they saw fit. Most importantly for the agency, though, was the 
ability to portray themselves as the competent experts.  
 The West Nile and listeriosis releases in this study show the agency to be in control 
without being controlling. When the CDC first assumed the role of lead health communication 
organization in the wake of the 2001 anthrax attacks, the agency had to exert itself as being 
competent and in control. However, CDC and public health culture embraces the value of 
building coalitions and getting local voices to convey their messages. This is especially 
important with the autism issue, in which parents have started to distrust the government, or at 
least harbor frustration at the fact that they don’t have answers to offer. The voices of other 
scientists, community leaders, and health care professionals agreeing with the CDC’s opinion 
certainly strengthen their position. More importantly, in a situation in which it outside of the 
111 
CDC’s authority to dictate or enforce what they say is the healthy choice (vaccination), they have 
to work to persuade the public that it’s the more attractive option. In cases like these, public 
relations tactics are the agency’s best weapon. 
 Autism does not manifest itself through outbreaks and vectors, like listeriosis and West 
Nile virus. The condition doesn’t carry the same sense of urgency or breaking news as an acute 
illness. As such, a constant flow of updates would likely not be an appropriate way to 
communicate with the press. On the other hand, the CDC was (and is) one of the most visible 
and best-liked of all of the federal agencies, and it was the one from which people clamored for 
answers on autism.  
The CDC has been a leader in health communication research for almost as long as health 
communication research has been a field. However, it isn’t clear whether they are using this 
research to craft the messages they deliver via press release in the same manner they would 
create messaging for a health campaign. For example, Hallahan discussed gain- and loss-
framing, and the corresponding risks people are willing to take in response to a message. The 
research he summarized found that “the prospect of a loss has a far greater impact on decision 
making than does the prospect of an equivalent gain.” This seems to partially explain anxiety 
over vaccination. However, the research also found that people are willing to take greater risks if 
it “means saving a life or reducing suffering.”398 With that knowledge, CDC could frame 
vaccination debate using the concept of herd immunity.  The risk of injury from a vaccine may 
seem less great when compared with the risk of causing illness, death, and suffering in others by 
passing along an otherwise preventable disease.  
The vaccine-autism debate has much larger implications than simply proving which side 
is right. It is part of the ongoing debate over whether U.S. health policy will be decided by faith 
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or science, and it is part of the debate—as old as the United States itself—over how much power 
the federal government has over individual citizens. More immediate, however, are the 
implications for the nation’s health if a critical mass of U.S. parents no longer view vaccination 
as essential, and the herd immunity the country has enjoyed for the past several decades degrades 
to the point that very young children, the elderly, and other immunocompromised people are no 
longer protected. (This is especially important when increasing international travel and 
emigration continue to import vaccine-preventable diseases.) Additionally, as some vaccination 
proponents are quick to point out, if the bulk of research funding and public attention are focused 
on proving or disproving this one cause (which they see as already disproven), that diverts 
resources away from finding “real” causes and treatments. 
Parikh’s recommendations would also help CDC staff with another framing problem they 
have had with vaccine communication. Parikh suggested countering the emotional, loss-framed 
messages of vaccine opponents with emotional, loss-framed messages of their own: he said they 
should counter opponents’ images of autistic children that accompany claims of a scientifically-
unproven causal relationship with vaccination with images of children with tetanus and other 
vaccine-preventable diseases. 399 Colgrove and Bayer wrote of the press successfully changing 
the focus of the debate by publishing stories on children disabled by vaccine-preventable 
diseases.400 The emotional content would not come from episodic framing, with the anecdotal 
evidence of one autistic child’s story, but from thematic framing, with the image of one child, 
sick with a vaccine-preventable disease, chosen to represent the millions of deaths and 
disabilities prevented worldwide by universal vaccination campaigns. 
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While newspapers and CDC press releases both exhorted people during the listeriosis 
outbreak to protect themselves by thoroughly heating pre-cooked meat products, and while 
certain individuals in USDA leadership were implicated for corruption (e.g., ignoring warnings, 
performing inadequate inspections), one of the big discoveries through the course of that 
outbreak was the fact that the system itself was flawed—it was shown to be inadequate to protect 
consumers. Likewise, the discovery that West Nile virus was transmissible via organ transplant 
and blood transfusion was not construed as a problem of individual responsibility either. It was 
largely positioned as a systemic issue: that the U.S. does not have any way in place, nor is it 
necessarily possible or feasible, to screen blood or donated organs for some deadly diseases, 
including West Nile. The organ donor likely contracted the disease after she was already in a 
coma, and from a blood transfusion, so even the patient representing the index case was herself a 
victim of the same problems as the subsequent victims.  
The coverage of autism, on the other hand, featured heavy use of episodic framing. There 
were numerous personal stories about angry, frustrated parents and their struggles as they cope 
with having an autistic child. Many stories featured activists and parents citing anecdotal 
evidence; some blamed the government, the NIH, or the CDC. The episodic framing made it 
possible to look at other “small-picture” frames that otherwise may not have been able to find 
footing. Notably, value frames positioning the debate as both faith vs. science and personal 
autonomy vs. big government were especially effective. 
Why was the coverage of autism different? Autism is a complex condition applied to a 
broad array of symptoms. The cause is unknown. The vaccine-specific part of the debate has 
continued in the British and American press for over a decade. Perhaps the reporters covering 
autism, like those who covered the anthrax attacks in 2001, resorted to non-expert sources to 
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satisfy their readership’s appetite for new information and fresh angles. Or perhaps, also like the 
reporters covering the anthrax attacks, they used these sources because of a dearth of information 
coming from the official sources. By comparison, the listeriosis and West Nile issues were 
characterized by an acute onset of an outbreak of an acute disease. When the press releases and 
other new information from public health agencies stopped flowing, the story—or at least the 
current incidence of the immediate threat—was over. 
Could the CDC have exerted more influence over the public debate over autism? Like 
questions about the causes of autism, that is difficult to answer. The debate over autism remained 
active over the course of the study period (2002-2007), and the public wanted to hear news about 
it, but relatively few scientific breakthroughs and new information about autism was released—
or at least, the information that was released did not herald the cause and cure the public hoped 
the scientific community would find. 
 Framing and agenda-setting theories aver that the media decides what becomes “news” 
by covering it as news, and that their coverage alone is adequate to make an issue “newsworthy.” 
Likewise, many stories that should have otherwise been important were ignored by the public 
because the press didn’t appear to have deemed them newsworthy.401 It was as if CDC’s 
leadership was applying agenda-setting theory—if they didn’t address the issue on a regular 
basis, the issue would eventually fade away. 
As much as the CDC’s response to the USA Today ad was warranted, and probably 
needed, the fact that this one ad drove them to react in such a fashion, when no other amount of 
accusations, protest, outcry, and even bad science had been able to, inadvertently gave credence 
to what otherwise could have been framed as a tiny fringe group with an irrational bone to pick. 
                                                 
401 An example might be a chain of corporate media outlets giving no coverage to the controversy over media 
consolidation; not necessarily because the issue is unimportant, but because it serves the interest of the parent 
company to divert attention away from the potential impact of consolidation. 
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With the exception of the response to the 2006 USA Today ad, all of the releases pertained to 
awareness, risk factors, and announcing research and partnerships. This indicates that the CDC’s 
strategy was to refrain from making press releases unless there was some new information to 
announce. This makes sense from a scientific standpoint, but the downside of this for the CDC is 
that this silence allowed the agency’s accusers to frame the debate as a big, heartless government 
infringing on the rights, health, and safety of the victimized individual.  
 From this study, it appears that the CDC has the most success garnering favorable 
coverage when they keep the public informed. Factual, informative press releases were issued 
frequently during the listeriosis outbreak and the West Nile organ transplant scare. The public 
and the press wanted information on these health issues, and the CDC provided it. With the West 
Nile/organ transplant case, Dr. Gerberding seemed quite capable of giving the impression the 
investigation was under control despite the fact that they didn’t know what was going on at first, 
and what they suspected actually sounded like something out of a horror movie. As a result, the 
press framed the CDC in a generally positive light, as being an active partner in working for 
public health.  
 With the Autism debate, the CDC’s lack of public attention to autism (at least compared 
to the attention the press was giving it) inadvertently framed the autism debate as either 
unimportant or inappropriate for the public sphere and to the U.S. government. Once CDC 
autism researchers and communication staff saw the vigor (and lack of scientific rigor) with 
which this issue came to be debated in the press, they would have almost certainly benefited had 
they responded with a similar level of vigor. A crisis-communication-style response, with CDC 
spokespeople listening to members of the public and addressing their fears and concerns would 
have quieted the anti-vaccine sentiment. It is likely that if CDC scientists and health 
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communicators had been more active, rather than reactive, in their response, even with their 
empathy, it could have soothed the anger of a small but vocal public. It is not too late to start 
down this path. 
 Positive framing tactics would also be helpful in addressing the autism debate. Wallack et 
al. wrote that “emphasizing the positive is a common tactic in framing contests.”402 Although 
autism is a devastating condition with no known cure or cause, there are still positive things that 
the CDC’s media relations staff can say about the subject of autism. The anti-vaccine activists 
and their negative/loss frames could be contested with positive ones talking about the research 
CDC’s scientists are doing, the research CDC is funding, and the groups with which the agency 
is collaborating. As was mentioned in the previous section, the millions of lives saved and 
disabling diseases prevented through vaccination is easy to show in a positive frame. 
 The truth is that the autism issue was a very complex and touchy subject, and it would 
have been difficult for any non-activist organization to emerge from it unscathed. The CDC’s 
autism research leadership and media relations staff did what they thought was the right thing to 
do in responding to the issue. West Nile and listeriosis were handled well and professionally. 
The fact that they were comparatively short health episodes helped the CDC’s leadership and 
media relations staff maintain interest with the press and the public until the outbreaks were over, 
but their relationship with, and efforts to reach, the press should not be discounted. The volumes 
of communication research their employees and contractors are now doing, the widespread 
sharing of lessons learned through their free journals, and recognition of their past successes 
practically ensures that they will continue to succeed in their mission to improve the world’s 
health. Certainly there are always mistakes to be made, but they appear to have the knowledge, 
skills, and dedication to ensure they learn from their lessons.  
                                                 
402 Wallack et al., 71. 
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Reporters make decisions that frame news and set agendas. To some degree, they decide 
what is going to be covered, and how it will be covered. This being the case, perhaps the CDC 
could use framing theory to help position their press releases to resonate with the press.  
 Journalists have needs that effective press releases must meet. Journalists seek to provide 
balance (often in the form of multiple viewpoints), readership (which drives revenue for their 
newspapers), and information. In order to address these needs, CDC Media Relations should 
consider some tips from the corporate PR playbook. Lordan wrote about the blurred lines 
between the jobs of public relations professionals and journalists. He maintained that it was 
essential that the two remain separated, to maintain the credibility of both403, but the areas of 
overlap he mentioned are helpful. Lordan said that both fields use similar tools, methods, and 
jargon, and work under the same kinds of deadlines.404 The CDC’s PR staff could use this 
common ground, in addition to a shared interest in public health, to anticipate the needs of 
journalists better. They could be more active in writing releases with tempting or interesting 
story lines or angles, and they could provide the kind of background information that lends itself 
to thematic rather than episodic framing.    
They should also learn from the successes of their opponents, who have used emotional 
frames to evoke panic, fear, and the sense that “big government” is increasingly intruding into 
people’s lives. The literature shows that episodic framing and going for the easy emotional 
appeal is “bad” journalism from the standpoint that it misrepresents the actual situation and 
neglects the context and underlying causes of an issue, but “good” journalism in the sense that it 
engages the reader and sells newspapers.  
                                                 
403 Lordan, 41-43. 
404 Ibid. 
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It would be irresponsible—and counterproductive—for a government agency in a 
democratic country to use deliberate fear appeals and emotional framing to garner press coverage 
in most situations. For example, it was in the best interest of the CDC, and the cause of public 
health in general, to not incite fear or frame emotionally in the case of the West Nile virus 
transmission through organ transplants, because doing so would cause further, unnecessary risk 
to public health. The agency’s communication personnel kept reporters and the public 
continually informed of the unfolding situation as well as the best ways to prevent West Nile 
virus, hoping to minimize the amount of panic over any potential risk to the blood or organ 
supply, or to the risk to recipients of donated blood or organs. If people had been afraid to donate 
blood or receive life-saving blood or transplants, the public health impact would have been far 
greater than that of the four people who contracted West Nile through their transplants. In this 
case, thematic framing served best for everyone involved. 
The approach needs to be tailored to the situation. The framing that worked for the West 
Nile virus/organ transplant issue wouldn’t have worked as well for the 2002 listeriosis outbreak. 
The listeriosis outbreak carried a higher risk of illness for the general public; only a relative few 
people need organ transplants, but everyone has to eat. The message had to be compelling 
enough to communicate the necessary prevention message. And while the unfolding 
investigation of the corrupt meat industry made for compelling news, CDC staff had to be careful 
not to get into legal trouble implicating Pilgrim’s Pride or step on the toes of their fellow 
government employees at the USDA.  
The press releases for West Nile and listeriosis showed that CDC communication staff 
have embraced the lessons learned about risk and crisis communication during and after the 2001 
anthrax attacks. However, with the exception of the response to the 2006 USA Today ad, those 
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lessons did not appear to have been applied in the case of the autism releases. Autism was treated 
as a just another ongoing research subject (albeit a particularly frustrating one), but to the 
effected population, it is every bit as stressful and frightening as the anthrax attacks. As was seen 
in the wide variety of coverage and angles in the autism newspaper stories, people want answers. 
Absent those answers, people want assurance that the government is trying their best to help 
them. 
Professionals from all over the CDC engage in innumerable purposeful health 
communications efforts. The CDC has participates in many effective nationwide, multi-year 
campaigns with large budgets aimed at getting people to perform an action (e.g., VERB: It’s 
What You Do405, a campaign to encourage physical activity in tweens), educate themselves (e.g., 
Get Smart: Know When Antibiotics Work406), screen for diseases and conditions (e.g., Learn the 
Signs: Act Early, a campaign to help parents recognize the signs of developmental delays and 
begin intervening as early as possible407), or engage in a preventive behavior (e.g., Choose Your 
Cover408, a skin cancer prevention campaign). In 2004 the agency created the National Center 
for Health Marketing, which takes proven theories and methods of developing, pricing, and 
selling products and bad behaviors and uses them to market and “sell” health behaviors.  
                                                
CDC Media Relations staff should consider taking the same careful, assertive approach to 
its press releases. Certainly, as in the case of the West Nile virus and listeriosis outbreaks studied 
here, press releases are often written under the same sorts of tight deadlines and limited flows of 
information that newspaper reporters experience. However, with ongoing issues like autism, the 
 
405 http://www.cdc.gov/youthcampaign/  
406 http://www.cdc.gov/drugresistance/community/campaign_materials.htm  
407 http://www.cdc.gov/ncbddd/autism/actearly/  
408 http://www.cdc.gov/cancer/skin/chooseyourcover/  
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CDC as a whole and its image would likely benefit from a more aggressive PR effort, whether as 
a stand-alone campaign or as part of a larger campaign.  
Limitations 
 The CDC proved to be a difficult subject at times in that it was often impossible to 
determine who was responsible for any given communication decision, policy, or piece. As a 
government agency with 16,000 employees and contractors, and with many of the hundreds of 
teams, branches, and divisions within the agency having their own communication personnel in 
addition to the main Office of Communication (under which the Office of Media Relations 
operates) and the separate National Center for Health Marketing, communication can come from 
many different sources within the CDC. Furthermore, scientists and researchers beyond a certain 
career level (typically GS-13) are often called upon to give quotable interviews to the press, 
while communications staff, including authors of press releases, do not receive attribution. 
Complicating these matters is the fact that the CDC is a bureaucracy within a bureaucracy—
CDC staff are expected to speak with one voice, and they are part of an administration that 
encourages all its leaders to also speak with one voice. All of these factors make it difficult, if 
not impossible, to tell who is responsible for any decision or action regarding CDC 
communication. 
Areas For Future Research  
Questions remain about why CDC’s communications staff didn’t choose to address the 
autism debate in a more aggressive manner. One question that would benefit from additional 
research is whether Bush administration policies influenced the CDC’s communication staff and 
autism researchers not to actively fight vaccine opponents who threatened the viability of the 
U.S. vaccination program with beliefs based on anecdotal evidence. President George W. Bush 
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created the White House Office of Faith-Based and Community Initiative in 2001 to encourage 
involvement of faith-based organizations in public health; in 2002 he issued the President’s 
Management Agenda which supported public funding of these organizations.409 Vaccine 
opponents often use religious exemptions to support their nonscientific beliefs about a vaccine-
autism link in order to prevent their own children from being vaccinated. The existing literature 
that could serve as a foundation for this research includes discussions of the Bush 
administration’s desire to have tight control over scientific communication410 and public health 
communication411, of their desire to silence and/or censor the voices of science412, and of the 
potential implications of this administration’s initiative to lessen the separation of church and 
state by promoting government funding of faith-based initiatives.413  
Another area for future research would be to determine whether public health coverage 
experienced a framing shift over the past decade and a half. Writing in 1993, Wallack et al. said 
that health issues are usually framed as individual responsibility, to the exclusion of implicating 
systemic problems.414 While that is certainly true for lifestyle-related conditions (as the authors 
said) like obesity and type 2 diabetes, this seems less true for the coverage of listeriosis and West 
Nile Virus cases used in this study. An interesting future study might be one to determine 
                                                 
409 Executive Office of the President and U.S. Office of Management and Budget. The President’s 
Management Agenda. FY 2002. http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/fy2002/mgmt.pdf (accessed 4 June 
2008). 
410 G. David Garson, “Patriotic Information Systems: Evaluating Bush Administration Information Policy,” 
Social Science Computer Review 23 (2005): 395-399. Also Maurie J. Cohen, “George W. Bush and the 
Environmental Protection Agency: A Midterm Appraisal,” Society and Natural Resources 17 (2004) 69-99. 
411 Winett and Lawrence, 20. 
412 Joel D. Aberbach, “The Political Significance of the George W. Bush Administration,” Social Policy & 
Administration 39:2 (2005): 135-140. Also Gerald Markowitz and David Rosner, “Politicizing Science: The 
Case of the Bush Administration’s Influence on the Lead Advisory Panel at the Centers for Disease Control,” 
Journal of Public Health Policy 24:2 (2005): 105-129. Also Cohen, 72-74. 
413 Ronald J. Hrebenar, review in Political Science Quarterly of Jo Renee Formicola, Mary C. Segers, and Paul 
Weber, Faith-Based Initiatives and the Bush Administration: The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly, Latham, MD: 
Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2003. 
414 Wallack et al., 68-70. 
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whether this is because of the peculiarities of these particular issues, or if this is a result of a shift 
in framing behavior. The public has become much more aware of public health activities, 
policies, and infrastructure since the 2001 anthrax attacks, and that could have an effect on 
framing trends in public health issues. 
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